A neutral, evidence-checked analysis
Headline received: “Andy Burnham says Britain could ‘go all the way’ and rejoin the European Union”
Reading time: approximately 30 minutes
Date of analysis: 11 October 2026
The verdict in brief
The central claim is substantially true but significantly overstated by the headline’s framing. On 30 September 2026, Prime Minister Andy Burnham did use the phrase “go all the way” on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme in the context of Britain rejoining the European Union. The words are his, and they were spoken in a formal interview, not invented.
What the headline does not tell you is that rejoining the EU was one of four options Burnham listed — alongside staying as Britain is, joining a customs union, and rejoining the single market — and that he hedged the statement heavily: he said he wanted to “look at the options”, assess “what is doable”, and weigh the “pros and cons” of each. He has said he would like Britain to rejoin the EU in his “lifetime” but that it was “not necessarily the case” that it should happen now. He explicitly said a referendum “wouldn’t be the right thing to do right now”. In other words, the headline converts a conditional, exploratory remark into something that reads like a commitment. That is the main distortion to watch for.
The rest of this article examines each element of the story against the available evidence: what was said and when, the political context (a new prime minister, a November UK–EU summit, shifting polls), the apparent tension with Burnham’s own earlier statements, the economic and polling evidence invoked by both sides, the reactions it provoked, and what “going all the way” would actually require in practice.
1. What was actually said — and when
The story unfolds over two days at the end of September 2026.
Tuesday 29 September 2026 — the Labour conference speech. Addressing the Labour Party’s annual conference in Liverpool — his first as leader and prime minister — Andy Burnham declared that Brexit had done “more harm than good” and promised to set out options for Britain’s future relationship with the EU around the time of a UK–EU summit scheduled for later in 2026. Conference coverage also noted other commitments he made in the same speech, including scrapping the pensions triple lock and creating a National Care Service, but the Europe passage is what generated the headlines.
Wednesday 30 September 2026 — the BBC Today interview. Asked directly whether he wanted Britain to rejoin the EU, Burnham replied that he wanted to “look at the options”. He then listed four:
- Stay as Britain is (“We could stay as we are. That’s definitely an option, if people think this is the right place to stay.”)
- Join a customs union — “we could look at what George Osborne has said about a customs union” (Osborne, the former Conservative chancellor, has publicly argued for this).
- Rejoin the single market — “we could look at what the Liberal Democrats said at their conference about the single market” (the Lib Dems had called for single-market re-entry at their own conference).
- Full rejoining — “or we could go all the way.”
He added that the options needed to be assessed on “what is doable” and the advantages and disadvantages of each, and said he did not want to leave the issue “hanging” — he wanted clarity about “where we want Britain to go in the next decade”.
Later on 30 September — the Chris Mason interview. In a separate interview with the BBC’s political editor, Burnham was pressed on whether a future Labour manifesto could promise a new in-out referendum. He said it was “possible”, but that a referendum “wouldn’t be the right thing to do right now”. The country, he said, needed to “consider the options” because “where we are isn’t good enough”. He was also challenged on whether this amounted to re-running the Brexit arguments he had promised, in May 2026, not to re-run (more on this below). His answer: “No, I’m not proposing that, am I? I am saying that in a context when we’re looking at a 10-year plan for Britain, Britain needs to consider the options as to where we will be.”
These are the verified primary facts. Everything else — the reactions, the interpretations, the predictions — is commentary built on top of them.
2. What the quote means — and, just as importantly, what it does not
Headlines are compressed by nature, but this one compresses out the most important qualifier: optionality. Read in full, Burnham’s statement is not a pledge to rejoin the EU. It is a pledge to consider rejoining the EU, among other models, over a ten-year horizon, with a summit in November 2026 as the moment when the options would be set out.
Several features of his wording matter:
- “Look at the options.” When asked directly whether he wanted Britain to rejoin, this was his answer. A commitment would have been “yes”.
- “We could go all the way.” Conditional. He did not say “we will” or “we should”.
- “What is doable.” An explicit acknowledgement that some options may not be achievable — a nod to the practical and political obstacles discussed in section 9.
- “Not necessarily now.” In earlier remarks, Burnham said he would like to see Britain rejoin the EU in his “lifetime” but that it was “not necessarily the case” that it should happen now. The Today remarks are consistent with that long-horizon framing.
- No referendum commitment. He ruled out an immediate referendum and left open only the possibility that a future manifesto — years away, with the next general election not due until 2029 — might include one.
This does not mean the remarks were meaningless. A sitting prime minister floating full EU rejoining as a live option, days after telling his party conference that Brexit had done “more harm than good”, is a genuine political event — and it was treated as one by the markets, by Brussels, and by the Conservative opposition. But there is a wide gulf between “a prime minister says rejoining is an option to be examined” and what the headline invites a casual reader to infer: that rejoining is now the plan.
3. Why now: the political context
To understand why Burnham said this in late September 2026, several pieces of context are needed.
3.1 A new prime minister
Andy Burnham became prime minister on 20 July 2026, succeeding Keir Starmer after an uncontested Labour leadership election triggered by Starmer’s resignation on 22 June. Starmer had lost the confidence of his MPs following poor local election results in May 2026. Burnham — the former Greater Manchester mayor, a cabinet minister under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, and twice a runner-up for the Labour leadership (2010, 2015) — returned to Westminster only after winning the Makerfield by-election on 18 June 2026, a contest arranged for that purpose after the constituency’s MP, Josh Simons, resigned to make way for him.
Burnham is, by all accounts, a different political animal from Starmer: a charismatic campaigner whose mayoral record in Greater Manchester gave him a national profile independent of Westminster. His arrival was followed by a bounce in Labour’s polling. He also inherited the same structural problem that ended Starmer: a government struggling for economic growth, with a slim working majority and pressure from both Reform UK on the right and the Greens and Liberal Democrats on the left.
3.2 The November UK–EU summit
Burnham said he would use a UK–EU summit planned for the second half of November 2026 to outline the options. The summit itself has a backstory: it was originally planned for the summer of 2026 but was postponed after the change of government in London, and its organisation has reportedly stalled over disagreements about the agenda each side wants to discuss. Expected items include youth mobility arrangements, check-free exports of food and drink across the Channel, immigration cooperation, and car exports. One report suggests the meeting could also unlock movement on cross-Channel migration returns after the end of the “one-in-one-out” scheme with France.
The summit matters because it is the first real deadline Burnham has attached to the Europe question. Until November, the “options” are rhetoric; after it, they will be judged against what was actually put on the table.
3.3 A changing economic argument
In his conference speech, Burnham said he wanted to add “percentage points” to economic growth by moving closer to the EU — something analysts note cannot be achieved within the parameters of Starmer-era “red lines”, which ruled out the single market, the customs union and free movement. The government is also reported to have been warned that the UK risks exclusion from the EU’s “Made in Europe” industrial policy, which would hit the British car industry.
3.4 Shifting public opinion
Polling on rejoining has moved substantially since the referendum decade began. A YouGov survey conducted 24–25 September 2026 — days before Burnham’s remarks — found 59% of Britons in favour of rejoining and 32% opposed. The trend across 2026 has been consistently in the 52–59% range for rejoining in YouGov’s regular polling, with similar results from Survation, Ipsos and Lord Ashcroft’s polling operation. Burnham’s claim in his conference speech that “around 60 per cent of the British public” agreed Brexit had done more harm than good is broadly consistent with these numbers, though it is his own framing rather than a direct poll finding. (The polling picture is more complicated than the headline numbers suggest — see section 8.)
4. The apparent contradiction with Burnham’s own earlier statements
The sharpest criticism of Burnham’s remarks is that they contradict what he said only months earlier. During the Makerfield by-election campaign in May 2026, Burnham said he was “not proposing that the UK considers rejoining the EU” and that the country should not “rerun” the Brexit arguments. In a BBC Radio Manchester interview he said: “I’ve not said we should now focus on rejoining. We had a vote, we shouldn’t keep re-running the arguments linked to that vote.”
The Conservatives seized on this. Deputy leader Alex Burghart said: “You cannot trust a word Andy Burnham says. Just a few weeks ago he said he wanted to move on from the Brexit arguments and now he is dragging Britain back into them by floating the prospect of rejoining the EU.”
How seriously should this charge be taken? Consider both sides:
The case that it is a U-turn. In May, rejoining was explicitly not on the table; in September, it is. The words are hard to reconcile at face value, and the political context explains why: Makerfield voted Leave in 2016, Reform UK was targeting the seat, and a pro-rejoin position would have been electorally dangerous. As one analysis put it, Burnham’s May remarks signalled “the limits of what a senior Labour figure believes can be argued in a Leave-leaning northern contest with Reform waiting to exploit any opening.” The contrast between the two positions is, at minimum, politically awkward.
The case that it is not. Burnham’s defence is that the May statement was about the immediate agenda (“the last thing we should do right now is rerun those arguments”) while the September statement is about a ten-year plan. His long-standing personal view — that he would like Britain to rejoin the EU in his lifetime — was on the record well before either statement, including during the by-election campaign itself. On this reading, nothing about his beliefs changed; what changed is the time horizon he is willing to discuss publicly.
A neutral assessment: the two positions are in genuine tension, and the timing — five months apart, with a by-election in between — invites scepticism about whether the May position was conviction or campaigning. But Burnham has a consistent through-line (personal support for eventual rejoining, opposition to an immediate re-run of the debate) that makes “evolution under new circumstances” at least as plausible as “cynical reversal”. Voters will ultimately decide which reading they believe. What matters for the fact-check is that both statements are on the record, and any account that mentions only one of them is incomplete.
It is also worth noting that Burnham was not the first senior Labour figure to move on this ground in 2026. Wes Streeting, another potential leadership contender, said over the summer that Britain should eventually seek to rejoin the EU. The direction of travel within the party predates Burnham’s premiership.
5. Labour’s manifesto red lines — abandoned?
Labour’s 2024 general election manifesto ruled out rejoining the customs union, returning to the single market, or restoring freedom of movement with the EU. These were Starmer’s “red lines”, designed to neutralise Brexit as an election issue.
Burnham’s September remarks cross all three lines in principle: the customs union and single market are now listed options, and single-market membership would in practice require free movement of people. The Times reported that his “decision to abandon” the red lines was “warmly welcomed by European leaders”.
Two caveats are in order. First, listing something as an option to be examined is not the same as adopting it as policy; the manifesto is not rewritten by a Today interview. Second, manifestos are by nature time-limited — the 2024 document governed the last election, not the next one, which is not due until 2029. Whether the next Labour manifesto contains any Europe commitment remains, by Burnham’s own account, undecided. What can be said is that the political space Labour occupies on Europe has moved, and Burnham moved it.
6. Reactions
The Conservative opposition
The Conservatives responded with a two-pronged attack: on Burnham’s credibility (the Burghart quote above) and on the substance. Party leader Kemi Badenoch called the rejoin discussion a “distraction” from fixing the economy, and made a substantive point that is worth taking seriously: “We are not going to get the same terms that we had. Does anybody really believe Andy Burnham is going to get Margaret Thatcher’s rebate back?” This is factually grounded — see section 9.
European leaders
The reception in Brussels and European capitals was warm. French President Emmanuel Macron said Britain rejoining the EU would be “excellent”, adding “Welcome back” — while also warning, in a separate remark, that Britain could not “choose between the freedoms of the union and decide to take what suits us and not the rest.” Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez said the UK would be welcomed “with open arms” if it decided to rejoin. Sandro Gozi, the Italian MEP who co-chairs the EU–UK Parliamentary Assembly, called it a “historic moment” and said Brexit “did not bring control; it cost opportunities”.
These statements are genuine, but they should be read with the usual diplomatic discount: expressions of welcome cost European leaders nothing and commit them to nothing. The actual decision would belong to 27 member states, not to two prime ministers’ press remarks.
Business groups
The Times reported that Burnham’s “clear path” on Brexit was “welcomed by business groups” — unsurprising, given that exporters and manufacturers have borne the brunt of post-Brexit trade friction.
Expert commentary
Anand Menon, director of the think tank The UK in a Changing Europe, identified three pressures pushing Labour toward a closer EU relationship: the economic impact of Brexit (“real and significant”), the political incentive to win back voters lost to the Greens, nationalists and the Liberal Democrats, and the changed geopolitical climate under a second Trump presidency, which makes “Europe seem a better bet than it used to”.
7. The economics: what the evidence says
Burnham’s case rests on the claim that Brexit damaged the economy and that closer ties would repair it. What does the evidence support?
The 6–8% figure. The number Burnham’s allies cite comes from a National Bureau of Economic Research working paper (Bloom, Bunn, Mizen, Smietanka, Thwaites and Abrahams, first published November 2025, revised June 2026). Using a decade of data and the Bank of England’s Decision Maker Panel survey of firms, the authors estimate that by the end of 2025 Brexit had reduced UK GDP by 6% to 8%, investment by 12% to 18%, employment by 3% to 4% and productivity by 3% to 4%. They attribute this to elevated uncertainty, reduced demand, diverted management time and resource misallocation from the protracted Brexit process, and note that contemporary forecasts were accurate over five years but underestimated the damage over a decade.
This is a serious, peer-reviewed-track paper by credentialed economists (including a senior Bank of England economist), and it is roughly double the UK’s own official estimate: the Office for Budget Responsibility still puts the long-run productivity hit at around 4%, with a 15% long-term drop in trade intensity. A Centre for European Reform report published in June 2026 estimated that Brexit had reduced UK exports to the EU by about 12% and imports by about 16%. Chancellor Rachel Reeves has publicly blamed Brexit for the UK’s economic deterioration, including at IMF meetings.
The counter-argument. Not everyone accepts that Brexit is the cause of Britain’s growth problem. Economist Paul Ormerod, writing for the pro-Brexit campaign group Briefings for Britain, argues that the low-growth narrative is “unsupported by the empirical evidence”, noting that EU countries suffer from the same productivity weakness and that Britain’s productivity has been weak since the late 2000s — long before the referendum. On this view, rejoining would not solve the underlying problem.
Assessment. The weight of mainstream economic research supports the claim that Brexit has materially reduced UK output — the NBER paper is the most striking recent estimate, but it sits within a consistent literature, and the OBR’s more conservative 4% figure points in the same direction. The Ormerod objection is a legitimate challenge to monocausal explanations of Britain’s productivity record, but it does not refute the measured trade and investment effects. What the economics cannot tell us is the counterfactual that matters politically: how much of the damage would actually be reversed by rejoining, and at what price in contributions, regulatory alignment and political capital. That is a judgement, not a measurement.
8. The polling: what the numbers really show — and what they don’t
Headline polling figures on rejoining look decisive. They deserve a closer look, because the answer depends heavily on the question asked.
The headline numbers (all 2026):
- YouGov, 24–25 September 2026 (2,062 adults): 59% rejoin, 32% stay out — the poll circulating in Downing Street and cited in the current debate.
- YouGov, 2–3 June 2026 (for The Times): 55% rejoin, 34% stay out.
- YouGov, 20–22 May 2026: 56% rejoin, 35% stay out.
- Survation, 19 May–1 June 2026 (10,024 adults): 55% rejoin, 32% stay out.
- Lord Ashcroft, 21–26 May 2026: 53% rejoin, 30% stay out.
- Ipsos, 14–20 May 2026: 52% would vote to apply to rejoin, 33% to stay out (rising to 58%/37% among those likely to vote).
- Opinium, May 2026: only 36% agree the UK should rejoin — a notably lower figure, illustrating how question wording moves the numbers.
- The Messina Group (reported in The Guardian, October 2026): 49% favour rejoining, 28.5% oppose; 48.2% support revising bilateral agreements; 47.1% favour joining a customs union.
The crucial caveat. When YouGov asked about rejoining without any of the opt-outs Britain previously enjoyed, support fell to 35% while opposition rose to 43%. This is the single most important polling detail in the whole debate, and it is routinely omitted from headline coverage. The 59% figure measures support for an abstract “rejoin”; support for rejoining on the terms actually available — no rebate, and in principle commitments on the euro and Schengen — is far softer. Badenoch’s rebate point is not just rhetoric; it is where the polling lead goes to die.
Demographics. Support is strongest among 18–34-year-olds (68% in Ipsos’s May poll), and among Green (86%), Labour (84%) and Liberal Democrat (80%) supporters; it is weakest among over-55s (37%), Conservatives (38%) and Reform supporters (17%). Rejoining is, in other words, popular with the coalition Burnham needs to hold together and unpopular with the voters he needs to win over.
A note on junk polls. One widely circulated claim — that “88 per cent oppose” Burnham’s rejoin plan — comes from a self-selected online poll of Express readers (6,624 respondents). Self-selected reader polls are not representative samples; they measure the views of people motivated enough to click. The contrast between the 88% figure and the 59% YouGov figure is not a contradiction to be “split down the middle” — it is a methods lesson. Representative polling consistently shows a pro-rejoin majority; opt-in reader polls consistently show the opposite. Only one of these is evidence about the country.
9. What “going all the way” would actually require
Suppose Burnham meant it literally. What would rejoining the EU actually involve? A Reuters analysis published on 4 October 2026 laid out the roadmap, and it is worth summarising because it shows how far the headline is from the destination.
Step 1: Decide. Burnham would have to move from “looking at options” to a firm commitment. He has not done this.
Step 2: Win an election on it. The next general election must be held by 2029. Reuters notes Labour is favourite to win the most seats, probably without an overall majority, and is “vying with Reform UK” for first place. Burnham has said a decision on rejoining would have to wait until after the election — and has not ruled out fighting it on an outright pledge to rejoin, which one pro-EU group’s polling (YouGov for Best for Britain) suggests would help Labour electorally.
Step 3: Possibly hold a referendum. Burnham says there “might” be a referendum on reversing Brexit. The Reuters analysis notes one way to structure it: a simple question on the principle of rejoining, leaving details to Parliament — a mirror image of 2016.
Step 4: Persuade all 27 EU members. This is the step headlines skip. Rejoining is not a unilateral act; under Article 49 of the EU treaty, the UK would have to apply and be admitted, requiring unanimous agreement of the existing members. Any single country could veto or extract concessions.
Step 5: Accept worse terms. The UK would not get its old deal back. The £4.5 billion annual rebate negotiated by Margaret Thatcher is gone. New members are in principle expected to commit to joining the euro and Schengen eventually — though, as Reuters notes, this “would not necessarily be a dealbreaker”, since Poland and Sweden retain their own currencies in practice. Britain would, however, be a rule-taker during a long accession process, aligning its regulations without a vote on them.
Step 6: Convince the EU it is for good. European leaders’ deepest worry is that Britain rejoins and then leaves again under a future government. The Reuters piece notes Burnham’s proposed voting-system reform as one mitigation (making it harder for an anti-EU party to win a majority on ~30% of the vote), and floats the idea of a supermajority threshold (55–60%) for the rejoin referendum to establish a precedent against casual reversal.
The honest summary: even on the most favourable assumptions — a Labour election victory, a referendum win, a cooperative Brussels — rejoining is a multi-year project with no guaranteed outcome and no return to the status quo ante. The headline’s “could go all the way” is doing a great deal of quiet work with the word “could”.
10. The provenance of this headline
The specific wording the user received — “Andy Burnham says Britain could ‘go all the way’ and rejoin the European Union” — matches a piece published by news.celebrity24h.com, an entertainment-gossip-style aggregator, on or around 10 October 2026. Its text closely paraphrases the Reuters report of 30 September (“Burnham says Britain should weigh EU options, including rejoining bloc”), reproducing the four options and the “go all the way” quote without adding any original reporting.
This is a familiar pattern in the current information environment: a real event, reported by wire services and quality press (Reuters, BBC, The Times, Le Monde), is then repackaged by low-quality aggregators whose business model is advertising revenue from social-media shares. The aggregator version is not false — the quote is real — but it strips context: no mention that rejoining was one option of four, no mention of the hedging, no mention of the “not right now” on a referendum, no mention of the May 2026 statements.
Readers encountering the story in this form should treat it the way they would a photocopy of a photocopy: the image is recognisable, but the fine print is gone. For this story, the fine print is most of the story.
11. Scorecard: what the headline’s claims amount to
| Claim (as implied by the headline) | Verdict | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Burnham said Britain could “go all the way” and rejoin the EU | Verified — the words are his, spoken on BBC Radio 4’s Today, 30 Sept 2026 | Reuters, BBC, The Times |
| He said this as a firm commitment or plan | Not supported — it was one of four options, heavily hedged, with no timetable | Full transcript context; his “look at the options” / “what is doable” framing |
| A referendum is on the table | Partially verified — “possible” in a future manifesto, but “wouldn’t be the right thing to do right now” | BBC/Chris Mason interview, 30 Sept 2026 |
| Rejoining will be in Labour’s next manifesto | Unverifiable — explicitly undecided; next election not due until 2029 | Burnham’s own statements |
| “Around 60% of the public” agree Brexit did more harm than good | Burnham’s assertion; broadly consistent with polling but not directly verified — YouGov 24–25 Sept: 59% back rejoining, 32% opposed | YouGov; BfB report of conference speech |
| Public support for rejoining is solid | Contested — 59% back abstract “rejoin”, but only 35% back rejoining without Britain’s old opt-outs (43% opposed) | YouGov detailed findings |
| Burnham previously ruled out rejoining | Verified — May 2026 Makerfield campaign: “not proposing that the UK considers rejoining”; “shouldn’t keep re-running the arguments” | BBC Radio Manchester; multiple reports |
| EU leaders welcome the idea | Verified — Macron (“excellent”, “Welcome back”), Sánchez (“open arms”) | The Times, Le Monde, Reuters |
| Rejoining is practically straightforward | Not supported — requires election win, possible referendum, unanimous 27-state approval, worse terms (no rebate), years of negotiation | Reuters roadmap analysis; Article 49 |
12. A note on method
This article treats the headline as a set of claims to be checked, not as a fact to be repeated. Sources are weighted by provenance: wire reporting (Reuters, AP) and established newsrooms (BBC, The Times, Le Monde) for what was said; peer-reviewed or institutional research (NBER, OBR, Centre for European Reform) for economic claims; published polling tables with sample sizes and dates for public-opinion claims; and explicit labelling where a source is partisan or low-quality (Briefings for Britain is a pro-Brexit campaign group; europesays.com and breakingbrexitnews.com are partisan aggregators; celebrity24h.com is a content farm).
Two things this article does not do: it does not adopt the loaded language of the debate (“betrayal”, “distraction”, “historic mistake”) as its own, and it does not predict what will happen. Whether Burnham’s “options” become policy depends on a November summit, a manifesto written years from now, an election, a possible referendum, and 27 foreign governments. The only honest forecast is that the argument will continue.
Sources consulted: Reuters (“Burnham says Britain should weigh EU options, including rejoining bloc”, 30 Sept 2026; “A roadmap for Andy Burnham to reverse Brexit”, 4 Oct 2026); BBC (Today programme interview and Chris Mason interview, 30 Sept 2026; Radio Manchester, May 2026); The Times (“Andy Burnham says UK could go ‘all the way’ to rejoining EU”; “Andy Burnham says a second Brexit referendum is an option”); Le Monde (“Burnham opens door to ‘Breturn'”, 2 Oct 2026); LabourList (conference speech preview, Sept 2026); NBER Working Paper 34459 (Bloom et al., “The Economic Impact of Brexit”, Nov 2025, rev. June 2026); OBR long-term Brexit estimates; Centre for European Reform (June 2026); YouGov rejoin polling (Jan–Sept 2026); Ipsos (May 2026); Survation (May–June 2026); Opinium (May 2026); Messina Group via The Guardian (Oct 2026); Wikipedia aggregated rejoin polling table (accessed Oct 2026); Briefings for Britain (Oct 2026); europeans.today (May 2026). Low-quality aggregators cited for provenance only: news.celebrity24h.com, breakingbrexitnews.com, europesays.com, thebritisheye.com.
