Nigel Farage and Kemi Badenoch (Image: Getty)
There is a 70% chance of the Conservatives and Reform UK merging before the next general election, according to a senior Tory MP.
Sir Edward Leigh, who is the Father of the House as the longest-serving male parliamentarian, predicted that the two right-wing parties were likely to team up.
Asked what he thought the odds were on a merger, Sir Edward told GB News’s Chopper’s Political Podcast: “Oh, I think very high.”
Pressed if it was “odds on”, he added: “70% I should think. Or if not merger [a deal of some sort].”
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Sir Edward also said he had “no idea” if Kemi Badenoch would lead the Tories into the next election, due by 2029.
Conservative MP Sir Edward Leigh (Image: Getty)
He said: “I have no idea. I wish her well. But I have to say going back in history we did burn through three leaders after we lost badly in 1997 before we got to one who won.
“So, whoever is leader at the moment, and by the way if Robert Jenrick had won people would be criticising him and saying he is a Tory boy, he is out of touch.
“So who knows who is going to lead us into the next [election] but I wish her well.”
But Ms Badenoch dismissed Sir Edward’s prediction, saying: “I am afraid I do disagree with Sir Edward. Everyone is entitled to their opinion but the Conservative Party is under new leadership. It is important that people know what we stand for.
“And the public are tired of backroom deals and not getting what it is that they vote for. What I need to make sure is that people can see that we are the party demonstrating true and authentic conservative principles.”
It comes after Ms Badenoch earlier this month dismissed the idea of an agreement with Nigel Farage‘s party as “for the birds”.
Reform leader Mr Farage has also ruled out a pact with the Conservatives.
It comes as the insurgent party, which returned five MPs at the last election, is leading some national opinion polls.
Top Tory Makes Major Prediction on Merger With Nigel Farage’s Reform UK
The possibility of a political alliance between the Conservatives and Nigel Farage’s Reform UK has returned to the centre of Britain’s political debate, with senior Conservative figures disagreeing over whether the two parties could eventually join forces to challenge their opponents.
The prospect of a merger has become increasingly significant as both parties compete for voters on the right, particularly those concerned about immigration, taxation, public spending and the direction of the country. Yet despite overlapping priorities, the Conservatives and Reform remain divided over leadership, political identity and whether cooperation would strengthen or weaken their chances of winning public support.
Former Conservative Cabinet minister Sir Jacob Rees-Mogg has reignited discussion about a possible agreement, suggesting that public opposition to a deal today does not necessarily mean the idea would remain off the table in different political circumstances. His intervention has brought renewed attention to a question that has troubled the Conservative Party since Reform emerged as a serious competitor: should the Tories fight Farage directly, or could an agreement eventually become necessary?
The latest debate comes as Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch has explicitly rejected an alliance, while Farage has left open the possibility of some form of post-election arrangement. Their contrasting positions reveal how complicated any attempt to unite the right could become.
Jacob Rees-Mogg Reopens the Debate
Rees-Mogg, a former Cabinet minister and prominent Conservative figure, has argued that political circumstances can change, even when leaders initially rule out cooperation.
Speaking during the Conservative Party conference in Birmingham in October 2026, he pointed to the history of political agreements in Britain, including the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition formed after the 2010 general election.
His argument was that politicians sometimes reject arrangements publicly before circumstances force them to reconsider. A statement ruling out a deal at one moment does not necessarily settle every possible future scenario.
The comparison with 2010 is particularly relevant because the election produced a hung Parliament, leaving the Conservatives without an overall majority. David Cameron subsequently formed a coalition government with Nick Clegg’s Liberal Democrats.
A similar situation involving Reform and the Conservatives would present a very different political challenge. The two parties compete directly for many voters, and their leaders have built their political identities around contrasting claims about how Britain should be governed.
Nevertheless, Rees-Mogg’s intervention highlights the difference between an immediate electoral pact, a formal merger and a post-election agreement. These are separate possibilities, each involving different political calculations.
An electoral pact could involve parties coordinating candidates in selected constituencies. A merger would require them to create a unified political organisation, agree on leadership and settle disputes over policy. A post-election agreement, meanwhile, could involve negotiations over parliamentary support after voters had already delivered their verdict.
Treating all three possibilities as interchangeable risks overlooking the practical obstacles that would have to be overcome.
Badenoch Draws a Clear Line
Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch has taken a more confrontational approach, rejecting the idea that her party should unite with Reform UK.
At the Conservatives’ October 2026 conference, Badenoch sought to present the Tories as a party capable of rebuilding its reputation and competing with Farage rather than accepting a subordinate role in a broader political movement.
Her strategy is based on the argument that the Conservatives must recover support by demonstrating that they can deliver their own programme. Rather than conceding that Reform has permanently captured voters on the right, she wants the Tories to challenge its policies, leadership and record.
The strategy also reflects concerns that an agreement could leave the Conservatives struggling to explain what distinguishes them from Reform. If the two parties adopted similar positions on immigration, taxation and government spending, voters might reasonably ask why they needed separate organisations in the first place.
Badenoch has also criticised elements of Reform’s political approach, making a formal partnership difficult to reconcile with her efforts to establish a clear Conservative identity.
Her position does not remove the pressure to recover voters who have moved to Farage’s party. It means she intends to address that challenge through competition rather than an alliance.
The approach carries its own risks. If the parties continue to divide support in closely contested constituencies, they could make it harder for either to achieve its objectives. But Badenoch’s argument is that the Conservatives should not abandon their independence simply because Reform has become a powerful rival.
Farage Leaves the Door Open to a Post-Election Deal
Farage has also resisted the idea of a formal pre-election pact, describing such an arrangement as highly unlikely. However, he has not entirely closed the door on a post-election agreement with the Conservatives.
That distinction is politically important.
Before an election, an agreement would require the parties to coordinate their campaigning and potentially ask supporters to vote for candidates from another organisation. Such a move could create resentment among activists who have spent years campaigning against the rival party.
After an election, the circumstances could be different. The number of seats won by each party, the parliamentary arithmetic and the policy concessions required to secure cooperation would all influence negotiations.
A post-election arrangement would not necessarily require a merger. Depending on the result, it could involve support for specific legislation, a confidence agreement or negotiations over the formation of a government.
However, such an agreement would still involve difficult choices. The Conservatives and Reform would need to decide which policies were non-negotiable, who would lead any joint political initiative and how disagreements would be managed.
Farage would also have to consider whether cooperation with the Conservatives would undermine Reform’s claim to represent a break with the established political system.
The party’s appeal partly rests on the assertion that the traditional parties have failed to deliver the changes voters want. Entering an arrangement with the Conservatives could expose Reform to criticism from supporters who expect it to remain independent.
For the Tories, the opposite problem would arise: a deal could alienate members and voters who believe the party must maintain a distinct identity.
Why the Two Parties Are Competing for Similar Voters
The dispute over a possible merger cannot be separated from the changes taking place within British politics.
Reform has attracted voters who are dissatisfied with the Conservatives’ record in government and believe the party did not deliver sufficiently on issues such as immigration, public services and economic management.
Farage has sought to turn that dissatisfaction into a broader political movement, presenting Reform as an alternative to both Labour and the Conservatives.
The Tories, meanwhile, are attempting to rebuild after their severe defeat in the 2024 general election, when they were reduced to 121 seats in the House of Commons.
The challenge is not simply to win back former Conservative voters. The party must also persuade the public that it has learned from its time in office and can offer credible solutions to Britain’s economic and social problems.
Recent polling illustrates how competitive the battle for the right remains. More in Common’s September 2026 MRP projected 147 seats for Reform and 125 for the Conservatives under its model. The organisation also emphasised that many seats held by both parties were marginal, making the projected totals sensitive to relatively small changes in support.
Such projections are not predictions of a guaranteed result. They are models based on polling and assumptions about how votes may translate into constituency outcomes. Nevertheless, they demonstrate why both parties have a strong incentive to consider their electoral strategies carefully.
A divided vote could affect the outcome in individual constituencies, but that does not automatically mean a merger would solve the problem. The effects would depend on local voting patterns, turnout, candidate appeal and whether supporters of one party would accept a candidate from the other.
Would a Merger Actually Work?
A formal merger might appear to offer a straightforward way to combine voters who want a change of direction. In practice, it would involve significant organisational and political difficulties.
The first question would be leadership. Farage has built Reform around his own public profile and political agenda, while Badenoch has an independent mandate to lead the Conservative Party. Neither leader would find it easy to surrender authority without a clear agreement about the future organisation.
The second challenge would be policy. Although the parties share some positions, they would need to resolve differences over economic priorities, public spending, taxation, international relationships and the role of government.
The third issue would be the parties’ members and activists. A merger negotiated by senior politicians would not necessarily be accepted by people who had campaigned against the other party for years. Local organisations could face disputes over candidates, resources and control.
Finally, a combined party would need to explain its identity to voters. If the merger were presented merely as a way to prevent another party from winning, it might struggle to establish a positive programme of its own.
Supporters of cooperation could argue that these difficulties are manageable if both sides agree on a common set of priorities. Opponents would counter that a forced union could import internal disputes into a new organisation without resolving the underlying differences.
The experience of political coalitions elsewhere suggests that shared opposition to a rival is not, by itself, enough to guarantee effective cooperation.
The Risk of Splitting the Right
The strategic argument for an alliance is that Conservative and Reform candidates may compete for similar voters in the same constituencies. Where the contest is close, a divided vote can affect which candidate wins.
That concern has encouraged some Conservative figures to argue that the parties should consider ways to avoid competing against each other everywhere.
However, electoral coordination is not a mathematical certainty. Voters do not always transfer their support when party leaders recommend that they do so. Some Reform supporters may refuse to vote Conservative, just as some Tory voters may reject a Reform candidate.
A pact could also affect turnout. Supporters who feel their preferred party has compromised its principles may decide not to vote at all.
There is therefore no guarantee that a merger or pact would increase the combined vote by the amount its supporters expect. The outcome would depend on the strength of local loyalties and the appeal of the arrangement itself.
Badenoch’s strategy rests on the belief that the Conservatives can recover voters by presenting a distinct alternative. Rees-Mogg’s intervention suggests that others within the party believe future circumstances could make cooperation worth reconsidering.
These positions reflect different assessments of the same problem rather than a settled agreement about the best route forward.
What Happens Next?
For now, there is no confirmed Conservative-Reform merger. Badenoch has rejected an alliance, while Farage has distinguished between a pre-election pact and the possibility of negotiations after an election.
Rees-Mogg’s comments have revived the discussion, but they do not establish that either party is preparing to combine its organisation with the other.
Much will depend on developments in the months ahead: polling, local election results, the performance of the government and the extent to which each party can persuade voters that it offers a credible alternative.
If Reform continues to attract significant support, pressure on the Conservatives to reconsider their approach may increase. If the Tories demonstrate that they can rebuild their electorate independently, the argument for a formal merger could lose some of its appeal.
The leaders would also need to consider whether cooperation would strengthen their position with the electorate or damage the distinct identities on which their parties depend.
Ultimately, the debate over a merger is about more than arithmetic. It concerns the future of the British right, the meaning of political independence and the extent to which two parties with overlapping ambitions can work together without undermining their own supporters.
Rees-Mogg has reminded Conservatives that political positions can change when circumstances change. Badenoch, however, is determined to challenge Farage rather than unite with him, while Farage has left room for a different conversation if the next election produces the conditions for one.
For now, the future of any agreement remains uncertain. What is clear is that the relationship between Reform UK and the Conservatives will continue to shape the debate over Britain’s political direction.