But that does not mean the outcome of what was a battle between Labour and the Greens was of little interest to either Nigel Farage or Kemi Badenoch.

While their respective parties are now almost neck and neck in the polls, Labour’s vote has increased by seven points since Andy Burnham became leader.

And while much of that advance has been at the expense of the Greens rather than Reform or the Conservatives, it still means Labour are now much better placed to defend seats against a challenge from either party of the right.

Consequently, Holborn was a vital test of whether the Greens’ challenge to Labour, a challenge that just a few months ago had enabled it to win the Gorton & Denton contest, has indeed, as the polls suggest, dissipated as quickly as it arose after Zac Polanski became the Greens’ leader 12 months ago.

The result indicates that the challenge is certainly weaker than it was but cannot as yet be entirely written off.

In the local elections last May, when the Greens were only a little below the zenith of their popularity, they, together with their allies in the ‘Camden People’s Alliance’, were only four points behind Labour in the constituency. On Thursday Labour were a much more comfortable 12 points ahead.

Yet, with 33 per cent of the vote, the Greens’ tally was still four points above what they and the pro-Palestinian independent won in 2024.

Meanwhile, Labour’s vote was four points down on what was already a much diminished vote for the party in 2024, thanks not least to antipathy to Sir Keir Starmer’s stance on Gaza within the substantial Muslim community in the seat.

In short, the result confirmed the message of the polls that Labour are still some way adrift of the level of popularity that gave the party a parliamentary landslide two years ago, while the Greens are at least still a little more popular than they were in 2024.

That, at least, gives the Conservatives and Reform some hope that Labour are still some way off from uniting the left under their umbrella.

And Mr Polanski will hope that his performance will be good enough to give him some cover in the wake of the barrage of criticism he has faced following the passage at his party’s conference of the controversial ‘Zionism is racism’ motion.

Meanwhile, although a long way behind both Labour and the Greens, the Conservatives will be pleased that they held their 7 per cent share of the vote and fended off Reform in the battle for third place.

Reform’s disappointment at failing to overtake the Tories will be made worse by the fact that the one-point gap between the two parties was less than the 2.5 per cent won by Restore Britain.

The falling out between Rupert Lowe and Nigel Farage still threatens to cost Reform dear.

‘I’ve Crunched the Numbers’: Rupert Lowe Threatens to Cost Nigel Farage Dearly – John Curtice

Nigel Farage’s ambitions for Reform UK are facing a new political challenge as Rupert Lowe’s rival movement threatens to divide support on the right of British politics. The emergence of Restore Britain has added another variable to an already fragmented political landscape, raising questions about whether Reform can maintain its momentum while competing with a party appealing to some of the same voters.

Political analyst Sir John Curtice has highlighted the potential consequences of this rivalry, arguing that even a relatively small shift in support could have significant implications for Reform’s electoral position. The central issue is not simply how many voters support Lowe, but where those voters come from and whether their presence changes the balance in closely contested constituencies.

For Farage, the challenge is particularly important because Reform’s strategy depends on turning national support into parliamentary seats. A party can perform strongly in opinion polls yet struggle to translate that support into a decisive election result if its vote is divided among competing candidates.

The Numbers Behind the Warning

Curtice’s analysis focuses on a fundamental feature of Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system: winning seats depends on receiving more votes than rival candidates in individual constituencies, not simply accumulating a large share of the national vote.

Under this system, a party can increase its national vote share without making equivalent gains in Parliament. Equally, a smaller rival can influence the result in numerous constituencies if it attracts voters who would otherwise have supported a larger party.

In comments reported earlier this year, Curtice explained that Reform’s position could weaken if its support fell from around 27 per cent while another party began drawing votes away from it. His point was that a figure that might be competitive when rival parties are divided can become less effective when another political force starts eroding the same pool of support.

That is the strategic problem posed by Lowe’s Restore Britain. If the new movement attracts voters who previously intended to support Reform, it could reduce Farage’s vote share in constituencies where every percentage point matters.

However, the precise impact would depend on the distribution of that support. A national polling change does not automatically translate into a specific number of lost seats, and the consequences could vary substantially from one constituency to another.

The numbers therefore offer a warning about the mechanics of the electoral system rather than a definitive forecast of the next general election.

Rupert Lowe’s Challenge

Lowe’s political break with Reform followed a bitter dispute with Farage and the party leadership. After leaving Reform, he developed Restore Britain into a separate political movement, positioning it as an alternative for voters who believe the existing right-wing parties have not gone far enough on issues such as immigration, national identity and government accountability.

The emergence of a new party in this political space creates an immediate strategic dilemma. Reform has spent considerable effort presenting itself as the principal alternative to the established parties. Restore Britain now has an incentive to challenge that claim and persuade dissatisfied voters that Lowe offers a different approach.

The two movements may share concerns on certain issues, but they are not identical organisations. Their leadership, political strategies and public presentation differ, and voters may support one rather than the other for reasons beyond individual policy positions.

For Lowe, the task is to convert visibility into a sustainable political organisation. That requires more than strong statements or a substantial online following. A party seeking national influence needs candidates, local networks, campaign resources and a clear programme that voters can understand.

It must also demonstrate that it can compete beyond the constituencies where its leader or most prominent supporters already have recognition.

Whether Restore Britain can achieve that remains an open question. But even before becoming a major electoral force, it can affect the debate by giving dissatisfied voters on the right another option.

Why Vote-Splitting Matters

The danger for Farage is rooted in the way Britain elects MPs. In a proportional electoral system, a party winning a certain percentage of votes would generally expect to receive a broadly comparable share of seats, subject to the rules of that system. Britain’s current arrangements work differently.

Each constituency elects one MP, and the candidate with the most votes wins. Votes for other candidates do not contribute directly to winning that seat.

Imagine a hypothetical constituency in which Reform receives 38 per cent of the vote, the Conservatives receive 35 per cent and Labour receives 27 per cent. Reform would win the seat.

Now imagine that a new rival attracts enough voters who would otherwise have supported Reform. If Reform falls to 31 per cent while the Conservative share remains unchanged, the Conservatives could win instead.

These figures are illustrative rather than a prediction about any real constituency. They demonstrate why a party can be vulnerable even when its underlying support remains substantial.

The effect becomes more complicated if the new party also attracts voters from the Conservatives, Labour or other political groups. The outcome depends on the source of its support, the strength of each opponent and the size of the existing margins.

This is why Curtice’s emphasis on the numbers matters. The question is not simply whether Lowe can build a following. It is whether that following changes the relationship between Reform and its rivals in enough constituencies to influence the parliamentary balance.

The Lesson of Britain’s Fragmented Right

The British right has experienced vote-splitting before. For years, UKIP challenged the Conservatives by attracting voters who wanted a more forceful approach to European integration and immigration. That pressure contributed to the political environment surrounding the 2016 Brexit referendum.

The historical comparison is not exact. UKIP operated in a different political climate, and the current relationship between Reform, the Conservatives and Restore Britain has its own dynamics. Nevertheless, the broader lesson remains relevant: a smaller party can exert influence beyond its direct electoral representation when it competes for votes that a larger party needs.

The existence of a rival may also force the larger organisation to reconsider its strategy. Reform could attempt to distinguish itself through policy detail, candidate selection, leadership messaging or its approach to government.

But responding to a rival presents risks. A party that moves too far towards its competitor may alienate voters who prefer a more moderate approach. A party that ignores the challenge may allow the rival to establish a stronger position among dissatisfied supporters.

Farage must therefore balance two objectives: protecting Reform’s existing coalition and persuading enough additional voters to support the party.

The emergence of Restore Britain complicates that task because the two movements may be competing for some of the same voters while seeking to establish different political identities.

Can Restore Britain Turn Attention into Votes?

A new political movement can attract attention quickly, particularly when its leader already has a public profile. Turning that attention into consistent electoral support is considerably harder.

Restore Britain will need to show that its support extends beyond people who follow political debates online. It must persuade voters to participate in elections, recruit credible candidates and establish an organisation capable of operating across a range of constituencies.

It will also need to explain how its proposals would work in practice. Voters may agree with a party’s criticism of the government without necessarily trusting it to manage public services, the economy or national security.

The party’s performance in polling will therefore be important, but polling figures must be interpreted carefully. Surveys can measure stated preferences at a particular moment, yet they cannot guarantee how people will vote at a future election. A new party’s support may rise as it becomes better known, or fall when voters examine its candidates and policies more closely.

The same caution applies to claims about which existing party would lose the most support. The only reliable way to establish that pattern is through detailed polling and, ultimately, election results.

For Lowe, the challenge is to demonstrate that Restore Britain represents a durable political constituency rather than a temporary expression of frustration.

Farage’s Strategic Dilemma

For Farage, the arrival of a rival on the right creates a problem that cannot be solved through electoral arithmetic alone.

Reform has sought to position itself as the main vehicle for voters dissatisfied with the Conservatives and Labour. Its success depends partly on maintaining a broad enough coalition to compete across the country while retaining a recognisable political identity.

Restore Britain could challenge that coalition from a particular direction, especially among voters who believe Reform has compromised too much or failed to deliver sufficiently ambitious change.

Yet an aggressive response could create its own difficulties. Farage may seek to reinforce Reform’s position on issues that matter to these voters, but such a strategy would need to be weighed against the preferences of other potential supporters.

The party must also consider organisational credibility. Voters evaluating a prospective government may look beyond headline policies to questions of experience, discipline, candidate quality and the practical delivery of promises.

Meanwhile, the Conservatives remain a competitor for voters on the right. If Reform and Restore Britain divide their support, the Conservatives could benefit in some constituencies. In others, the distribution of votes could produce different results, depending on local circumstances.

There is no automatic winner from a divided political landscape. The outcome depends on how voters respond and whether the competing parties can convert their support into effective campaigns.

What the Polls Can—and Cannot—Tell Us

Curtice’s warning illustrates the importance of distinguishing national polling from constituency-level outcomes. A party’s national vote share is useful for understanding its broad position, but it cannot by itself determine how many MPs it would win.

Analysts need to examine regional patterns, constituency margins, voter movements and the degree to which parties compete for the same electorate. They must also account for uncertainty in polling, changes in turnout and the possibility that voters behave differently when an election approaches.

The arrival of Restore Britain makes these questions more important. If the movement draws substantial support from Reform, the consequences could be significant in some seats. If it mainly attracts people who would otherwise abstain or support other parties, the effect on Reform could be more limited.

It is also possible that the existence of another party could change the campaign itself. Reform might receive more media attention, face stronger scrutiny or be pushed to clarify policies that it has previously presented in broad terms.

Those developments could influence voters independently of the direct transfer of votes between the two parties.

Consequently, any claim that Lowe will cost Farage a specific number of seats should be treated cautiously unless it is supported by constituency-level evidence and transparent assumptions.

A Contest with Wider Consequences

The rivalry between Farage and Lowe is part of a wider transformation in British politics, in which established party loyalties have weakened and voters have become more willing to consider alternatives.

That fragmentation creates opportunities for new movements but also makes electoral outcomes harder to predict. Parties must compete not only against their traditional opponents but also against organisations appealing to dissatisfied voters within their own political territory.

For Reform, the key question is whether it can preserve its position as a major electoral force while a rival seeks to occupy some of the same space. For Restore Britain, the challenge is whether it can turn its public profile into an organisation capable of winning meaningful support at the ballot box.

Curtice’s analysis offers a reminder that relatively small changes can have substantial consequences under Britain’s electoral rules. A few percentage points may determine who wins a closely contested constituency, even when the national picture appears relatively stable.

But the arithmetic is only one part of the story. Leadership, organisation, campaign performance, policy credibility and voter participation will also shape the result.

The rivalry between Farage and Lowe is therefore about more than two political figures competing for attention. It concerns the structure of the British right and the practical difficulty of turning fragmented support into parliamentary power.

Whether Restore Britain becomes a lasting electoral force remains to be seen. What is clear is that its emergence has introduced another variable into Reform’s calculations—and that, in a first-past-the-post system, the distribution of votes can matter just as much as the total.