Andy Burnham Tries to Quell By-Election Backlash Over Call to Rejoin EU as He Lurches Left
Andy Burnham has faced a political balancing act over Europe after his previous support for closer relations with the European Union became a potential vulnerability during his campaign for the Makerfield parliamentary seat.
The issue was especially sensitive because Makerfield had been a strongly pro-Brexit constituency. Burnham therefore needed to persuade voters that his views on Brexit would not become a new battle over Britain’s membership of the European Union.
His response was carefully calculated.
Burnham said that Brexit had been damaging, but insisted that Britain should not simply reopen the arguments of the 2016 referendum. He also said that he was not proposing that the UK rejoin the EU, arguing that constantly revisiting the issue would leave the country stuck in a “permanent rut”.
That position allowed him to occupy an awkward middle ground.
He could acknowledge the economic and political problems associated with Brexit without directly asking voters to reverse the decision.
But the controversy did not disappear.
Burnham had previously expressed the view that he would like to see Britain rejoin the EU during his lifetime. At the same time, potential Labour leadership rival Wes Streeting openly argued that Brexit had been a “catastrophic mistake” and said Britain should eventually return to the European Union. That immediately created speculation about whether the two politicians were competing to define Labour’s future relationship with Europe.
For Burnham, the timing could hardly have been worse.
His immediate objective was to win Makerfield.
His longer-term objective was to reshape Labour.
Those two ambitions did not necessarily point in the same direction.
A strongly pro-European message might appeal to younger voters and sections of the Labour electorate, but it could also alienate voters who supported Brexit and who viewed the referendum as a democratic decision that should be respected.
That tension explains why Burnham’s campaign language became noticeably more cautious.
He emphasised domestic issues, regional investment and the economic problems facing places such as Makerfield. He argued that communities outside London had been neglected for decades and presented his political philosophy as an alternative to what he described as the failures of deindustrialisation, deregulation, privatisation and austerity.
This was a deliberate attempt to change the subject.
Rather than allowing the election to become a referendum on Brexit, Burnham wanted it to become a referendum on whether Britain should adopt a different economic model.
That strategy ultimately worked.
Burnham won the Makerfield by-election with 24,937 votes, securing 54.8 per cent of the vote and defeating Reform UK candidate Robert Kenyon by more than 9,000 votes. The result was considerably stronger than Labour’s performance in the 2024 general election.
Yet the victory does not necessarily settle the Brexit question.
Indeed, polling before the election suggested that Makerfield itself was more complicated than its Leave reputation might imply. UCL Policy Lab polling found that 55 per cent of respondents said they would vote to rejoin the EU in a hypothetical referendum, compared with 45 per cent who would vote to remain outside.
That is an important detail.
It suggests that the political landscape has changed since 2016.
A constituency can have voted Leave and still contain a substantial number of voters who have reconsidered the issue. Younger voters, in particular, have grown up with the consequences of Brexit rather than the arguments that dominated the original referendum.
Nevertheless, Burnham clearly understood that reopening the membership question would carry political risks.
The smarter strategy was therefore to talk about Europe without talking about rejoining Europe.
That distinction has become increasingly important since Burnham entered national politics.
His government now faces the question of how far Britain should move towards the EU without formally reversing Brexit.
Recent developments suggest that Burnham wants a significantly closer relationship with Brussels. During a visit to Kyiv in August 2026, he said Britain needed to be “bolder” in getting closer to the European Union and called for greater cooperation across multiple areas, while continuing to rule out immediate re-entry.
That represents a significant evolution in tone.
The political calculation is understandable.
Britain can seek closer economic and political cooperation with Europe without formally becoming an EU member. The government can pursue agreements on trade, youth mobility, research, energy and other areas while insisting that the referendum result remains respected.
But critics will argue that closer integration could gradually amount to Brexit being reversed by another name.
That is already the argument being made by Reform UK.
The party has warned against what it sees as a gradual transfer of authority back to Brussels and insists that British voters voted to leave the EU rather than slowly restore European control.
This gives Reform a powerful political weapon.
Farage does not need Burnham to announce that Britain is rejoining the EU.
He only needs to convince voters that every new agreement with Brussels represents another step in that direction.
For a party that has made Brexit and immigration central to its political identity, that argument could be extremely effective.
It also presents Burnham with a difficult communications problem.
Suppose Britain negotiates a youth mobility agreement with the EU.
Burnham can describe it as a practical arrangement allowing young Britons greater opportunities to study, work and train across Europe.
Reform can describe the same agreement as another erosion of Brexit.
Both descriptions can appeal to different audiences.
The same is true of trade agreements.
Closer cooperation could reduce barriers for British businesses and exporters. That could be economically beneficial, particularly for companies that depend on European markets.
But opponents can argue that greater regulatory alignment limits Britain’s ability to diverge from EU rules.
The question therefore becomes one of sovereignty versus economic pragmatism.
That debate has never really disappeared.
It has simply changed form.
Burnham’s political challenge is to convince voters that Britain can repair some of the economic damage associated with Brexit without pretending that the referendum never happened.
That is a much more complicated message than either “Brexit was wonderful” or “Brexit must be reversed”.
It requires voters to accept that political decisions can have both benefits and costs.
Burnham’s argument appears to be that Britain should stop fighting the cultural battles of 2016 and concentrate on what works now.
That is a potentially powerful position.
But it also exposes him to accusations from both sides.
Brexit supporters may say that he is quietly undoing the referendum.
Pro-European voters may say that he is being too cautious and refusing to go far enough.
And Labour’s internal rivals may use the issue to challenge his leadership.
The latter point is particularly important.
Burnham’s European policy cannot be separated from his broader battle to define Labour.
The party is attempting to rebuild its coalition after years of political instability. It needs support from urban voters, younger voters and university graduates, but it also needs working-class voters in former industrial communities.
Those groups do not always agree about Brexit.
That is why Burnham’s political instinct is to move the conversation away from the binary question of Leave versus Remain.
His economic message is designed to provide a different dividing line.
Instead of asking whether Britain should be inside the EU, he wants voters to ask whether the British economy is working for them.
This explains his repeated emphasis on regional inequality.
Burnham has argued that areas such as Makerfield were damaged by deindustrialisation and subsequently neglected by successive governments. His broader political vision, which he has associated with “Manchesterism”, is intended to challenge what he regards as an overly centralised economic model.
That message appears to have resonated strongly in Makerfield.
But there is a danger for Burnham.
Once he becomes prime minister, voters will expect results rather than speeches.
Closer relations with Europe will be judged according to whether they improve trade, investment, jobs and opportunities.
A more interventionist economic model will be judged according to whether it actually improves living standards outside London.
And promises to redistribute resources from wealthier areas will inevitably raise questions about who pays.
Burnham therefore cannot rely on ideological arguments.
He needs measurable outcomes.
That is especially true because his government is operating in a difficult economic environment. Burnham has recently acknowledged that Britain’s financial outlook is challenging and has promised to approach the economy cautiously. He has also ruled out an early general election, arguing that political and economic stability should take priority.
That caution may ultimately shape his European policy as well.
There is a difference between wanting closer relations with Europe and immediately seeking membership.
The first can be presented as pragmatic.
The second would almost certainly reopen the political divisions that Burnham has repeatedly said Britain should move beyond.
For now, Burnham appears to understand that distinction.
He wants Britain closer to Europe, but he does not want to fight another Brexit referendum.
He wants to challenge the economic model associated with the past few decades, but he also needs to reassure financial markets and businesses.
He wants Labour to become more ambitious, but he needs to maintain support among voters who distrust Westminster politics.
That is an extraordinary political balancing act.
The Makerfield result demonstrated that Burnham can win a constituency where Reform expected to be highly competitive. His 54.8 per cent vote share was a substantial achievement and gave him considerable political momentum.
But winning Makerfield does not mean he has solved Labour’s European dilemma.
It may simply mean that voters were more interested in Burnham himself and his promises for the local area than in the Brexit question.
That distinction could become crucial at a future general election.
A national campaign would expose Burnham to voters with very different experiences of Brexit.
Some will want Britain to move closer to Europe.
Others will see any such move as betrayal.
Some will prioritise immigration and sovereignty.
Others will prioritise trade and economic opportunity.
Burnham will have to speak to all of them.
His best hope is to make the argument that Britain can look forward without endlessly relitigating the past.
His opponents will argue that closer ties with Brussels are simply Brexit reversal by stealth.
And that is where the real political battle begins.
The question facing Burnham is no longer simply whether Britain should rejoin the European Union.
He has already said that he is not proposing that.
The much bigger question is how close Britain should become to Europe—and how much of the Brexit settlement his government is prepared to change.
That distinction may sound technical.
Politically, it could determine the future of Labour.
And it could determine whether Burnham succeeds in persuading a divided Britain that moving closer to Europe is not a return to the past, but an attempt to build a different future.