Andy Burnham Condemns Masked Anti-Migrant Protests as “Not the British Way” as Channel Crossings Keep Immigration at Centre of UK Debate
Prime Minister Andy Burnham has condemned masked anti-migrant demonstrations in southern England as deliberately intimidating, while insisting that the government recognises legitimate public concern about immigration. His intervention came during a week in which 781 people crossed the English Channel in small boats in a single day — the highest daily figure of 2026 — even as the year-to-date total remained substantially below last year. Behind the confrontation lies a more complicated national argument involving border control, asylum accommodation, protest rights, policing and the increasingly difficult question of how Britain distinguishes legitimate political dissent from intimidation and disorder.
Britain’s immigration debate has entered another intensely contested period after Prime Minister Andy Burnham publicly condemned the tactics used by some anti-migrant demonstrators, saying that masked protesters dressed in black and seeking to intimidate communities were behaving in a way that was “not the British way.”
The comments immediately attracted attention because they came at a politically sensitive moment. Only days earlier, official figures showed that 781 people had arrived in the United Kingdom after crossing the English Channel in ten small boats on September 23. It was the largest single-day total recorded in 2026. Yet the same statistics also showed something that can easily disappear from the political argument: overall Channel arrivals were considerably lower than at the equivalent point last year. ITVX
That contrast — a dramatic daily surge occurring during a year of substantially lower overall crossings — illustrates the difficulty of discussing Britain’s migration situation through a single statistic.
The dispute is therefore about considerably more than Burnham’s choice of words.
It is about whether the government is making meaningful progress on irregular migration, whether communities hosting asylum accommodation have been listened to, how demonstrations should be policed, whether politicians adequately distinguish peaceful protesters from people accused of violence or intimidation, and whether the government’s gradual reduction in asylum-hotel use represents genuine progress or simply a change in where asylum seekers are housed.
Those questions have become increasingly intertwined.
Burnham’s “Not the British Way” Intervention
Burnham made his remarks during an interview with ITV News Meridian following a series of anti-immigration demonstrations in southern England, including protests in Dover, Portsmouth, Gosport and Basingstoke.
Some participants had appeared wearing dark clothing and face coverings. In Dover, masked demonstrators had blocked road access to the port. Six people were arrested following another gathering at a marina in Gosport.
Asked specifically whether he condemned protesters wearing black and concealing their faces, Burnham said that he did because, in his view, the appearance was intended to intimidate.
He described attempts to create fear on British streets as something the country should reject and said residents should be able to live normally without fearing groups arriving in their communities to provoke unrest. ITVX
But an important part of Burnham’s answer was less confrontational than some subsequent headlines suggested.
He explicitly acknowledged public concern about immigration.
His argument was that there should be a distinction between citizens expressing concern over immigration policy and behaviour involving attacks on police, intimidation of members of the public or deliberate attempts to create disorder.
“I recognise the concern that many people in the public have around immigration,” Burnham told ITV, before arguing that intimidating behaviour represented “something different.” ITVX
That distinction is central to understanding his position.
Burnham was not saying that opposition to immigration was inherently unacceptable. Nor did his comments establish that every person attending the demonstrations had behaved unlawfully or intended intimidation.
Instead, his criticism focused particularly on masked groups and incidents involving confrontations with police and disruption.
That distinction matters because demonstrations themselves encompass people with different motivations and behaviour. Some may be residents concerned about immigration levels or asylum accommodation. Others may be political activists. Police may also encounter smaller groups or individuals whose conduct crosses from lawful protest into alleged criminal behaviour.
Treating all those categories as interchangeable risks obscuring what actually happened.
What Happened in the Channel at the Same Time
The political controversy intensified because the Prime Minister’s remarks coincided with another highly visible development.
On September 23, 781 people arrived in Britain aboard ten small boats, according to provisional Home Office figures.
That made it the busiest single day of Channel crossings recorded in 2026.
The average was approximately 78 people per vessel, highlighting the increasingly crowded nature of some crossings. ITVX
The official Home Office daily data recorded:
September 21: 150 arrivals aboard three boats.
September 22: 154 arrivals aboard three boats.
September 23: 781 arrivals aboard ten boats.
There had been no recorded arrivals during the preceding four days covered by that Home Office release. Tnaqa
Weather, policing, smuggling operations and conditions along the French coast can cause crossings to vary dramatically from one day to another. Consequently, an unusually high daily figure does not necessarily reveal the direction of the longer-term trend.
And the longer-term numbers told a noticeably different story.
By September 23, approximately 18,565 people had crossed the Channel in small boats during 2026.
At the equivalent point in 2025, the figure had been 32,188.
That represented a reduction of approximately 42 per cent year on year.
The 2026 total was also approximately 26 per cent lower than at the same stage of 2024, when 25,165 arrivals had been recorded. ITVX
So two statements could simultaneously be true.
Britain had just experienced its busiest Channel-crossing day of the year.
And Britain had experienced substantially fewer small-boat arrivals overall than during the corresponding period the previous year.
Political arguments that present only one of those facts risk giving audiences an incomplete picture.
Does a 42 Per Cent Reduction Mean the Problem Is Being Solved?
That depends partly on what standard is being applied.
For the government, a reduction of more than 40 per cent provides evidence that enforcement, cooperation with European authorities and action against trafficking networks are producing results.
For critics, approximately 18,500 people arriving through an unauthorised and dangerous route remains far too many, regardless of whether the number was higher the previous year.
Both perspectives explain why immigration statistics can generate radically different political interpretations.
A government can demonstrate measurable progress without having solved the underlying problem.
Equally, a particularly dramatic day of arrivals does not erase a substantial annual decline.
The government’s own language reflected that tension. After publication of the September figures, it argued that progress in reducing small-boat crossings was clear but simultaneously acknowledged that the remaining level was unacceptable and that further action was necessary. ITVX
There was another reason for concern.
Two small boats had recently managed to reach British shores without the usual interception by Border Force.
Such uncontrolled landings are unusual.
Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood ordered an urgent review, describing even one uncontrolled landing as too many. The incidents raised questions about surveillance and interception capabilities despite the broader decline in arrivals. The Independent
This created an awkward political situation.
The government could point to an improving statistical trend while simultaneously confronting highly visible failures that reinforced public anxiety about whether the border was genuinely under control.
The Protest Movement Cannot Be Understood Without the Asylum-Hotel Debate
Although Channel crossings dominate headlines, much of the recent protest activity has centred on what happens after people reach Britain.
In particular, hotels used to accommodate asylum seekers have become highly contentious.
The system developed because people who claim asylum and would otherwise be destitute are legally eligible for government support while their cases are considered. When conventional accommodation has been insufficient, hotels have been used as temporary accommodation.
The policy has proved politically difficult for successive governments.
Critics object to the financial cost, the concentration of asylum seekers in particular communities, inadequate consultation with local residents and concerns about pressure on public services.
Campaigners supporting asylum seekers counter that people awaiting decisions still require safe accommodation and warn against portraying individuals collectively as a threat because of their immigration status.
The government has committed itself to ending asylum-hotel use.
And there has been measurable movement in that direction.
According to a June 29 statement to Parliament, hotel use had fallen from roughly 400 properties at its earlier peak to just under 170. The number of asylum seekers living in hotels had fallen from approximately 56,000 at the 2023 peak to around 21,000 at the time of the statement. Câu Hỏi Tuyên Bố Quốc Hội
Further closures followed.
In August, the Home Office announced that another 13 asylum hotels had been returned to their communities. GOV.UK
Independent fact-checking provides useful context.
Full Fact reported in September that 16,021 asylum seekers were living in hotels at the end of June 2026, approximately 46 per cent fewer than in June 2024.
The organisation also reported that fewer than 160 hotels were being used by August 2026, compared with 213 when Labour entered government in July 2024. Full Fact
That is substantial progress, but the figures require careful description.
The number of people living in asylum hotels had fallen by close to half compared with the point at which Labour entered government.
The number of hotels themselves had not fallen by half over that same period.
Earlier political claims about Labour having already “halved” the number of asylum hotels were challenged by Full Fact because much of the decline from the historical peak had occurred before Labour took office. Full Fact
This illustrates another recurring problem in Britain’s immigration argument: percentages can describe different measurements and different starting dates.
What Does the “50 Per Cent Drop” Actually Refer To?
Claims that asylum-hotel use has fallen by around 50 per cent therefore need a denominator.
If the claim concerns the number of asylum seekers housed in hotels, there is strong evidence for a reduction approaching that scale compared with the period around Labour’s arrival in government.
If it concerns the number of hotels being used, the reduction under Labour has been smaller.
And if today’s figures are compared with the historical peak of hotel use rather than the moment Labour took office, the decline is much larger.
Sky News calculated that the 16,021 asylum seekers in hotels at the end of June represented a roughly 70 per cent reduction from the September 2023 peak of 56,018. It also noted that the data predated Burnham becoming Prime Minister on July 20, meaning that reduction could not reasonably be attributed to his premiership alone. Sky News
That last point is particularly important.
Political leaders frequently inherit trends established under predecessors.
Burnham can defend or modify government policy, but statistics covering periods before he became Prime Minister should not be presented as though they resulted entirely from decisions made during his tenure.
Why Closing Hotels Does Not End the Accommodation Question
Closing asylum hotels also does not necessarily mean that every person previously staying there has left Britain.
Some may receive asylum decisions.
Some may be removed or voluntarily leave.
Others may move into different forms of asylum accommodation.
Full Fact noted that as hotel use declined, the use of dispersal accommodation — including houses in multiple occupation — increased. Full Fact
The government has also explored larger accommodation sites as alternatives to hotels.
That produces another policy trade-off.
Hotels are expensive and highly visible. Closing them can reduce expenditure and return buildings to ordinary commercial use.
But moving asylum seekers elsewhere does not eliminate the government’s responsibility to accommodate eligible people whose claims remain unresolved.
Large sites can themselves generate local opposition.
Dispersal housing can place pressure on housing markets and councils.
Faster asylum decisions can reduce accommodation requirements, but decisions also require sufficient administrative and legal capacity.
And removing people whose claims fail depends on cooperation with destination countries, documentation, legal procedures and transport arrangements.
Consequently, the politically simple slogan “close the hotels” leads into a much more complicated administrative question:
Where should people awaiting asylum decisions actually live?
Any government attempting to end hotel accommodation eventually has to answer it.
Burnham’s Argument About “Scoring Political Points”
Burnham has argued that politicians should address genuine public concerns without exploiting them for political advantage.
That position will inevitably be contested.
Opposition parties argue that criticism of government migration policy is a legitimate part of democratic politics, particularly when border control ranks among voters’ concerns.
Protesters may similarly argue that demonstrations are necessary precisely because they believe mainstream institutions have failed to respond adequately.
The government, meanwhile, argues that legitimate concern should not be used to justify intimidation or disorder.
These positions overlap in one important respect: peaceful political opposition is not the same thing as violence or intimidation.
British law protects freedom of expression and assembly while also allowing police to intervene where behaviour crosses legal thresholds involving violence, criminal damage or other offences.
The difficult political question is where rhetoric about protest movements places that dividing line.
If politicians describe peaceful demonstrators too broadly as extremists, they risk alienating citizens expressing legitimate concerns.
If they minimise violence or intimidation because those responsible happen to share a political cause, they risk normalising unlawful behaviour.
Burnham’s interview attempted to navigate that distinction by explicitly recognising public anxiety about immigration while condemning particular protest tactics.
Whether voters accept that distinction is another question entirely.
The Politics of Masks
Face coverings have acquired particular symbolism in these demonstrations.
There can be legitimate reasons for covering one’s face at a protest, including privacy or personal security.
A face covering alone does not demonstrate criminal intent.
But organised groups wearing similar dark clothing and masks can also appear threatening to residents or police, particularly when demonstrations involve confrontations, road blockages or attempts to interfere with official operations.
Burnham’s criticism was directed at this latter perception.
He argued that the presentation was intended to intimidate.
That is an interpretation of protesters’ motives rather than something that can automatically be established simply from their clothing.
Some protesters may reject his description and argue that they cover their faces because they fear identification, employment consequences or harassment.
Others may deliberately adopt a confrontational appearance.
Without evidence concerning individual participants, those possibilities should not be collapsed into a single assumption.
What can be established is that Burnham explicitly connected masked appearances with intimidation, and that some recent demonstrations have resulted in arrests.
Six people were arrested following the Gosport demonstration discussed during the ITV interview. ITVX
Separately, anti-migrant activist Daniel Thomas was charged with criminal damage following an incident involving a migrant dinghy. Those allegations are subject to criminal proceedings and should not be treated as proof of guilt unless established in court. Financial Times
The distinction between allegations and convictions is particularly important when political demonstrations overlap with ongoing criminal cases.
A Border Problem That Has Changed Shape
Small-boat crossings are also evolving operationally.
Smuggling organisations adapt to enforcement.
Greater policing around traditional departure areas can encourage traffickers to launch boats from locations farther along the French coast, potentially increasing journey lengths and danger.
One vessel associated with the September surge reportedly departed from Normandy, considerably farther west than many traditional departure points, and spent more than 33 hours at sea before reaching Britain. ITVX
That demonstrates the challenge facing enforcement authorities.
Closing one route does not necessarily destroy a smuggling network.
It can displace it.
Increasing patrols can alter departure points.
Intercepting equipment can encourage gangs to obtain replacements.
Strengthening coastal surveillance can encourage longer routes.
And restricting one migration pathway can increase pressure on another.
This does not mean enforcement is ineffective. The substantial year-on-year reduction in crossings suggests that policy changes and operational circumstances have affected the numbers.
But it does explain why governments are reluctant to promise a precise date on which small-boat crossings will reach zero.
Irregular migration is not controlled by Britain alone.
France, Belgium, other European governments, trafficking networks, migrants themselves, weather conditions and international conflicts all influence what happens.
The Human Cost Behind the Statistics
Political arguments frequently reduce the Channel to numbers.
781 in one day.
18,565 during the year.
42 per cent lower than last year.
Ten boats.
But every crossing also involves people travelling through one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes aboard vessels that are often overcrowded and unsuitable for the conditions.
The risks are not theoretical.
Recent crossings have again produced fatalities.
Three people — a 10-year-old Eritrean boy and two women — died following an incident involving an overcrowded migrant boat off the French coast in late September. French authorities indicated that the victims may have been crushed during panic aboard the vessel rather than drowning. The Times
Such incidents complicate the political discussion.
Supporters of tougher enforcement argue that preventing departures is itself a humanitarian objective because it reduces the market for smugglers and prevents dangerous journeys.
Refugee advocates argue that enforcement without accessible lawful routes can leave desperate people dependent on smugglers.
Those are competing policy arguments about how to reduce dangerous crossings, not necessarily disagreements about whether the deaths themselves are tragic.
Any durable solution has to confront both border control and the conditions that allow trafficking organisations to sell places aboard unsafe boats.
Why One Record Day Can Be Politically Powerful
A figure such as 781 carries extraordinary political power because it is easy to visualise.
“Highest day of the year” makes a strong headline.
A 42 per cent annual decline requires context and comparison.
This asymmetry affects public debate.
People experience politics through individual events as much as through annual statistical trends.
A single uncontrolled beach landing can therefore generate greater political attention than thousands of interceptions that occur routinely.
One violent protest can shape perceptions of an entire movement.
One crime involving an asylum seeker can dominate discussion despite providing little information about the behaviour of a broader population.
Conversely, one dramatic example of racist abuse can lead commentators to characterise a much wider group of immigration critics in ways that peaceful participants reject.
Responsible political reporting therefore has to resist extrapolating from exceptional incidents.
The September 23 crossings were real.
So was the 42 per cent year-on-year reduction.
The protests were real.
So were arrests associated with some demonstrations.
Public concern about immigration is real.
So is the government’s responsibility to protect people legally entitled to seek asylum while their claims are assessed.
Those facts coexist.
The Question of Racism
Another sensitive aspect of the dispute concerns attempts to characterise anti-migrant demonstrations collectively as racist.
That requires considerable caution.
Opposition to high immigration, irregular migration or asylum hotels does not by itself establish racial prejudice.
People may object because of expenditure, housing pressures, border sovereignty, public services or dissatisfaction with the asylum system.
At the same time, racist language or conduct can occur within broader protest movements.
The existence of legitimate policy concerns does not make discriminatory behaviour impossible.
The reverse is also true: evidence of racist conduct by some participants does not establish the motives of every person attending a demonstration.
Burnham’s own comments are notable because he concentrated primarily on intimidation, policing and public order rather than simply categorising all immigration opponents under one ideological label.
That may explain why he simultaneously emphasised that he understood public concern.
The political challenge is to preserve enough distinction for both statements to remain possible:
People can legitimately demand lower immigration or stronger border enforcement.
People cannot legitimately use those beliefs as a licence for violence or intimidation.
Are Communities Being Ignored?
Perhaps the most politically significant criticism of asylum accommodation concerns consultation.
Residents frequently argue that decisions are announced after arrangements have already been made.
That can generate resentment even among people who might otherwise accept that asylum seekers need somewhere to live.
Questions commonly raised include the capacity of local healthcare, policing and housing services; the concentration of accommodation in particular areas; security arrangements; the length of time a facility will operate; and the financial impact on local authorities.
Governments face an uncomfortable dilemma.
Extensive consultation can delay urgently required accommodation.
Insufficient consultation can destroy local trust.
And once trust disappears, rumours can fill the information vacuum.
The experience of Crowborough in East Sussex demonstrates how quickly such disputes can polarise communities. More than 300 male asylum seekers were housed at a local military site during 2026, leading to recurring demonstrations both supporting and opposing the arrangement. Reporting from the town described frustration over the government’s consultation process alongside misinformation, threats and deepening divisions. The Guardian
The lesson extends beyond any single town.
Accommodation policy is not merely an immigration question.
It is also a local-government and community-cohesion question.
What Has Actually Improved?
Removing political rhetoric leaves several measurable developments.
Small-boat crossings in 2026 were running substantially below their 2025 level by late September.
The number of asylum seekers housed in hotels had fallen considerably.
The number of hotels used for asylum accommodation had also decreased.
Returns from the UK had risen compared with earlier periods, although the composition of those returns matters when interpreting the numbers.
And the government continued closing hotels while attempting to expand alternative accommodation. Full Fact
Those developments provide evidence of movement.
They do not prove that the system is fixed.
Thousands of people are still making dangerous Channel journeys.
Thousands remain in temporary accommodation.
Local opposition continues.
Smuggling networks continue adapting.
Uncontrolled landings, although rare, have exposed weaknesses.
And the political temperature surrounding immigration remains exceptionally high.
Progress and continuing failure are therefore not mutually exclusive descriptions.
The disagreement is largely about which should receive greater emphasis.
What Has Not Been Proven
Several stronger interpretations circulating around this controversy require more evidence than is currently available.
There is no basis for assuming that every participant in an anti-migrant demonstration shares the same ideology or intentions.
Nor does wearing a mask by itself prove violent intent.
Similarly, a fall in hotel use does not demonstrate that the entire asylum backlog or accommodation problem has disappeared.
The 781 arrivals on September 23 do not demonstrate that annual crossings are increasing; available comparative figures showed the opposite at that point.
And the year-on-year decline does not demonstrate that Channel crossings are close to ending.
These distinctions may sound technical, but they matter enormously.
Immigration is precisely the kind of subject where accurate statistics can still produce misleading narratives if their context is removed.
Burnham’s Bigger Political Test
For Burnham, immigration may become one of the defining tests of his premiership.
He has attempted to position himself between two pressures.
On one side are voters demanding stronger border enforcement and faster reductions in irregular migration.
On the other are concerns about community cohesion, racism, the treatment of asylum seekers and the danger of political rhetoric escalating into street confrontation.
His approach appears to be to acknowledge the first while drawing a firm boundary around the second.
Whether that balance proves sustainable will depend less on speeches than on results.
If Channel crossings continue declining, hotel closures accelerate and uncontrolled landings remain rare, the government will have stronger evidence for its claim that policy is working.
If arrivals begin rising again or accommodation disputes intensify, opposition parties and protest movements will argue that the government’s assurances are disconnected from conditions on the ground.
The data will therefore matter.
So will public perception.
And the two do not always move together.
Britain Is Arguing About More Than Immigration
The intensity of the current controversy reveals something broader about the country’s politics.
The argument concerns borders, but also trust.
It concerns whether citizens believe official statistics.
Whether governments listen to local communities.
Whether opposition politicians describe migration accurately.
Whether police enforce public-order laws impartially.
Whether asylum seekers are treated as individuals rather than political symbols.
And whether people with fundamentally different views can still occupy the same democratic space without intimidation.
Burnham’s phrase — “not the British way” — is ultimately an argument about that democratic culture.
His critics are entitled to challenge his policies and his interpretation of protest behaviour.
Protesters are entitled to demand changes in immigration policy within the law.
The government is entitled — and required — to maintain public order.
And asylum seekers remain entitled to have their individual claims processed according to British law rather than being judged collectively through political rhetoric.
None of those principles requires agreement about how high immigration should be.
The Numbers Behind the Headlines
The clearest picture available in late September is consequently more nuanced than either side’s most dramatic slogans suggest.
781 people crossing the Channel in one day was a significant event. It was the largest daily total of 2026. Tnaqa
But overall small-boat arrivals remained roughly 42 per cent lower than at the same point in 2025. ITVX
Asylum-hotel use has fallen substantially, with 16,021 people living in hotels at the end of June 2026, around 46 per cent fewer than when Labour entered government. Full Fact
But closing hotels does not mean every person concerned has left the asylum-support system, because alternative accommodation is also being used.
And some recent anti-migrant demonstrations have involved arrests and allegations of disorder, but that does not establish that everyone protesting immigration policy supports intimidation or violence. ITVX
Those qualifications are not incidental.
They are the story.
A Debate Unlikely to Disappear
Britain’s migration debate is unlikely to calm simply because annual crossing numbers decline.
The issue has accumulated too many overlapping grievances: housing shortages, public spending, border sovereignty, asylum delays, local consultation, crime concerns, national identity and declining trust in institutions.
That means governments cannot address the political problem solely by pointing to percentages.
But opponents of the government cannot accurately describe the situation solely through the worst day of the year either.
The strongest evidence currently shows a system still under considerable pressure but also one in which several important indicators have moved downward.
For Burnham, that creates both an opportunity and a vulnerability.
He can point to fewer Channel crossings and fewer people living in asylum hotels.
His opponents can point to the 781 people arriving in a single day, rare uncontrolled landings and continuing demonstrations in coastal communities.
Neither set of facts cancels the other.
Ultimately, the argument prompted by Burnham’s “not the British way” comments asks Britain to confront two questions simultaneously.
How should a democratic government respond when a substantial part of the public believes immigration is inadequately controlled?
And how should a democratic society respond when political anger moves beyond peaceful protest into intimidation, violence or attempts to obstruct the authorities?
The first requires policy.
The second requires policing and respect for democratic boundaries.
Confusing the two risks making both problems harder to solve.
The coming months will show whether the decline in Channel crossings can be sustained, whether the government can fulfil its commitment to eliminate asylum-hotel use without simply transferring pressures elsewhere, and whether political leaders can address public anxiety without deepening divisions.
For now, the most defensible conclusion is considerably less dramatic than many of the headlines surrounding the controversy.
Britain has not stopped the small boats.
But the number crossing in 2026 has fallen markedly compared with last year.
The government has not eliminated asylum hotels.
But their use has substantially declined.
And public opposition to immigration has not disappeared.
The central democratic challenge is ensuring that people remain free to express that opposition peacefully while police and courts deal with alleged intimidation or criminal conduct on the basis of evidence and law rather than political identity.
That distinction may ultimately matter far more than any single day’s crossing figure.