Kemi Badenoch has once again rejected the possibility of an electoral pact or coalition between the Conservative Party and Nigel Farage’s Reform UK, describing the idea of a combined Conservative-Reform government as “monstrous”. Her comments underline the deep divisions on the British political right and raise an important question about whether Conservatives and Reform UK should cooperate in order to challenge Labour, or whether they are better off competing against each other.
Badenoch’s latest remarks came during an appearance at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe, where she was questioned about the possibility of working with Farage. Her answer was clear: she does not want an electoral deal with Reform, either before or after an election. She has also rejected the idea of a coalition government if an election produces a hung parliament, saying that she would prefer another election rather than creating what she described as a “monstrous Reform-Conservative hybrid”.
Her position is not new. In June, Badenoch argued that recent by-election results had effectively killed the idea of a Conservative-Reform pact. She claimed that the Conservatives could succeed without making an agreement with Farage and that the results demonstrated the weakness of the argument for uniting the right.
The debate is important because Reform UK has become a serious competitor to the Conservatives. Farage’s party has attracted voters who previously supported the Conservative Party, particularly on issues such as immigration, national sovereignty, taxation and the size of government. Reform’s growing popularity has therefore created a strategic problem for the Conservatives. If the two parties compete for the same voters, they could divide the right-wing vote and allow Labour or another party to win constituencies that neither Conservative nor Reform candidate could win alone.
Supporters of an electoral pact argue that cooperation could prevent this problem. They believe that Conservative and Reform candidates could stand aside in selected constituencies, allowing the strongest candidate on the right to defeat Labour. This strategy might appear particularly attractive in constituencies where the Conservatives have historically been competitive but Reform has recently gained significant support.
However, Badenoch believes that such an arrangement would damage rather than strengthen the Conservative Party. She has argued that a deal could repel as many voters as it attracts. In her view, the Conservatives should develop their own political identity rather than becoming part of a larger alliance dominated by Farage.
This argument reflects a fundamental difference between the two parties. Although both Conservatives and Reform support tighter immigration controls and a smaller role for government in some areas, they are not identical organisations. Badenoch wants to present the Conservative Party as a serious governing institution with a long history. Reform, meanwhile, has built much of its appeal around challenging the political establishment and criticising traditional parties.
Badenoch has been particularly critical of Reform’s internal disputes. She has argued that Reform politicians spend too much time fighting with each other and has portrayed the party as lacking the disciplined, organised approach that she believes is necessary to govern Britain effectively. Recent events have provided material for that criticism. Tim Montgomerie, a prominent Conservative defector to Reform, was suspended by the party after publicly criticising Farage and Reform’s home affairs spokesperson Zia Yusuf.
Badenoch has also taken a much harder line against Conservative politicians who have defected to Reform. She recently described some former Conservative colleagues who joined Farage’s party as among the most dishonest people she had ever met. She specifically indicated that she did not want “drama queens” in her party and suggested that former defectors should not expect an easy return to the Conservatives.
This hostility demonstrates how seriously Badenoch views the threat from Reform. Instead of trying to bring Farage closer to the Conservatives, she appears determined to compete directly with him. Her strategy is to convince voters that the Conservative Party remains the natural home for people who want lower taxes, stronger borders, reduced welfare spending and greater economic freedom.
The difficulty is that Reform has already succeeded in attracting many voters who once considered themselves Conservative. If Badenoch refuses cooperation, she must therefore provide a convincing reason for these voters to return. Simply attacking Farage may not be enough. The Conservatives need policies that address concerns about living costs, housing, immigration, public services and economic growth.
The issue also raises questions about political leadership. Farage is one of the most recognisable figures in British politics, with a long history of campaigning on Brexit and immigration. His ability to communicate directly with voters has helped Reform build a distinctive political brand. Badenoch, by contrast, is attempting to rebuild a Conservative Party that suffered a major electoral defeat and subsequently lost support to Reform.
Badenoch’s supporters would argue that joining forces with Reform could destroy the Conservative Party’s identity. If the Conservatives became too closely associated with Farage, moderate voters might move elsewhere. The party could also find itself defined by immigration and cultural issues at the expense of economic policy, public services and government competence.
There is also a question of trust. A political pact can be difficult for voters to understand. If a Conservative candidate tells voters that Reform is wrong but then agrees to cooperate with Reform after an election, voters may regard the arrangement as opportunistic. Badenoch appears to believe that it is better to be honest about the differences between the parties than to make a temporary agreement designed purely to win seats.
On the other hand, critics of Badenoch’s position could argue that political parties exist to win elections and implement policies. If Labour remains stronger than both Conservatives and Reform individually, refusing to cooperate could allow Labour to benefit from divisions on the right. From this perspective, ideological purity may be less important than removing Labour from government.
The question becomes even more complicated in a hung parliament. If no party wins a majority, politicians have to decide whether to form a coalition, create a confidence-and-supply arrangement, or hold another election. Badenoch has indicated that she would rather seek another election than create a Conservative-Reform coalition.
That is a remarkably strong position. Elections are expensive and disruptive, and there is no guarantee that a second election would produce a Conservative majority. If voters had already rejected a clear majority for the Conservatives, asking them to vote again could potentially frustrate the public. Nevertheless, Badenoch appears to believe that a Conservative-Reform government would be even more damaging.
Her argument is partly based on political culture. She wants to portray the Conservatives as a party of serious government rather than a vehicle for personalities and political protest. In one of her recent speeches, she described her Conservatives as a party of “serious people, not drama queens”. She accused Reform of distracting from Conservative attacks on Labour rather than helping to remove Labour from power.
This distinction is central to Badenoch’s strategy. She wants voters to believe that Reform can complain about Britain’s problems but cannot necessarily govern effectively. Her message is that the Conservatives have the experience and institutional knowledge required to turn conservative ideas into government policy.
Reform, however, can make the opposite argument. Farage can claim that the traditional Conservative Party has already had its opportunity and failed. Conservative governments under David Cameron, Boris Johnson, Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak faced serious political and economic problems, and many voters may therefore question why they should return to the same party.
This creates a difficult battle for the future of Britain’s political right. The Conservatives need to regain voters from Reform without alienating the voters who remain loyal to the party. Reform wants to expand beyond its existing support and demonstrate that it can replace the Conservatives as the main alternative to Labour.
Recent polling and electoral developments make this competition particularly significant. Reform has at times moved ahead of the Conservatives in national polling, while the Conservatives have attempted to rebuild after their poor performance in the 2024 general election. The two parties therefore have strong incentives to attack one another rather than cooperate.
Yet their competition could ultimately benefit Labour. If Conservative and Reform candidates split the right-wing vote across hundreds of constituencies, Labour may win seats with relatively modest levels of support. This is a major strategic problem for Badenoch. Her refusal to cooperate may strengthen the Conservative brand but could simultaneously make it harder for the wider political right to defeat Labour.
The Conservatives therefore face a difficult choice. One strategy is to form some kind of electoral arrangement with Reform and accept the political compromises that would follow. The other is to remain independent, rebuild the Conservative brand and attempt to win back Reform voters over time.
Badenoch clearly favours the second strategy. She appears to believe that the Conservative Party cannot survive by becoming a junior partner to Farage. Instead, she wants the party to demonstrate that it can once again become a credible national governing party.
Whether this strategy succeeds will depend heavily on policy as well as personality. Voters will want answers about taxation, immigration, welfare, public services, defence and economic growth. If Badenoch can show that the Conservatives have a coherent plan for these issues, she may be able to rebuild support. If not, Reform could continue to attract dissatisfied Conservative voters.
The personal relationship between Badenoch and Farage is also likely to remain confrontational. Badenoch has repeatedly criticised his leadership style and political methods, while Farage has challenged the Conservatives’ claim to represent voters on the political right. Their rivalry is therefore both ideological and personal.
Nevertheless, Britain’s political future will not be determined by either leader alone. Voters will ultimately decide whether they prefer a traditional Conservative alternative, a more populist Reform alternative, or another political option entirely. The electorate may also change its priorities as economic conditions and public concerns develop.
In conclusion, Kemi Badenoch’s rejection of an electoral deal with Nigel Farage represents a clear attempt to protect the independence and identity of the Conservative Party. She believes that a Conservative-Reform alliance would create a “monstrous” political combination that could repel as many voters as it attracts. She also argues that Reform’s internal disputes demonstrate why the Conservatives should not rely on Farage to achieve political success.
However, the strategy carries significant risks. By refusing to cooperate, the Conservatives could allow Reform to continue taking votes from them and potentially split the right-wing electorate. At the same time, an alliance could destroy the Conservative Party’s distinct identity and drive moderate voters away.
The coming years will therefore be crucial for Badenoch and the Conservatives. Their challenge is not simply to defeat Nigel Farage, but to convince millions of voters that the Conservative Party deserves their support again. If Badenoch can rebuild the party around credible policies, disciplined leadership and a clear economic vision, her refusal to make a deal with Reform may prove successful. If she cannot, Farage may continue to expand his influence and permanently reshape British politics.
For now, however, Badenoch’s message is unmistakable: she does not want a Conservative-Reform merger, pact or coalition. She wants the Conservatives to stand on their own and prove that they can win without Nigel Farage. Whether that decision ultimately strengthens the Conservative Party or divides the British right will be one of the most important political questions in the years ahead.