Labour hoped the France deal would deter migrants (Image: Getty)
France refused to take back up to half of the migrants Britain wanted to boot out under Keir Starmer’s one-in-one-out deal, it emerged today. The former Prime Minister insisted the deal would help end small boat crossings, when it was announced in 2025. But France simply refused to accept many of the cross-Channel migrants that were supposed to be returned to its territory, according to a scathing watchdog report.
The scale of the failure was laid bare by John Tuckett, the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. He said Paris hid behind data protection diktats to avoid handing immigration officials the reasons for refusals – which meant the Home Office wasted time trying to return migrants that France would eventually reject.
The arrangement ended in October because France refused to sign a new agreement, insisting instead that Downing Street should sign a pact with the EU as a whole.
Mr Tuckett said: “The criteria and basis on which the French authorities accepted or rejected individuals referred under the OUT route were not transparent to UK caseworkers.
“The Agreement requires regular reporting from France on reasons for refusal, but this is anonymised, given various legal restrictions on sharing personal data for the purposes of the Agreement.
“This limited the ability of Home Office officials to manage and improve the process. This is the critical rate-determining step for the OUT route and comes towards the end of the process.
“Further clarity in this area would avoid nugatory effort and resources being spent in preparing cohorts where the refusal rate has been as high as 50%.”
Some 1,631 migrants were returned under the scheme, while Britain accepted 1,496.
Officials privately hoped to remove 100 people a week by May. But the Home Office never hit this number.
Mr Tuckett said: “A ‘roadmap to 100’ delivery plan started in February 2026 anticipated 100 returns per week from mid-May, sustaining that number for four weeks.
“In early May 2026, the ramp-up to two charter return flights per week was running approximately two weeks behind schedule, and the pilot had not yet achieved its 100 returns per week target, nor sustained that level for any period.”
The inspector’s bombshell report comes after 21 people successfully crossed the Channel without being intercepted, reaching the Kent coast.
It is the third this year, prompting renewed fears over Britain’s border security.
The cohort arrived at Samphire Hoe, Kent, and were met by officers.
Shabana Mahmood hoped for more from the France deal (Image: Getty)
Mr Tuckett’s comments confirm allegations made by a senior whistleblower in an exclusive investigation by the Daily Express in May.
A source told us: “At this stage, we would want to be returning 200 a week.”
Referring to Operation Hillmore, the official name of the “one in, one out” deal, the source said: “We are returning 30. We can only detain 75 new arrivals. So, if we are only removing 30 people, Operation Hillmore isn’t a deterrent.
“We need more resources. Detention spaces, charter aircraft spaces to get people out and more cooperation with the French, but they are their own sovereign nation.
“They don’t want these people there, even if Britain pays them for it.
“There’s no reason to believe overall flows of migration will be any lower than they have been in the previous years. I just don’t think they realised what the blockages were.
“They weren’t listening to the staff who were telling them.”
Labour’s Small Boats Deal Branded a Dismal Failure as France ‘Refused to Take Back Migrants’
The British government’s controversial agreement with France to tackle illegal Channel crossings has come under renewed criticism after an official investigation revealed serious problems with the operation. The scheme, introduced under former Prime Minister Keir Starmer, was intended to discourage migrants from making dangerous journeys across the English Channel by introducing a so-called ‘one in, one out’ arrangement.
However, newly published findings have raised questions about whether the agreement delivered the results promised by Labour. French authorities reportedly rejected up to half of the migrants Britain attempted to return under the scheme, creating delays, administrative difficulties and additional costs for British taxpayers.
The revelations have intensified the political debate over border security, immigration enforcement and Britain’s relationship with France following Brexit.
For Labour, the controversy represents another challenge in demonstrating that its immigration policies can deliver practical results. For critics, it raises a more fundamental question: how can Britain effectively control irregular migration if the government cannot secure reliable cooperation from the country across the Channel?
The ‘One In, One Out’ Agreement Under Pressure
The agreement between Britain and France was announced in July 2025 by Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron.
Known as Operation Hillmore, the pilot scheme was designed to establish a reciprocal arrangement between the two countries.
Under its terms, migrants arriving in Britain through small boats could be detained and returned to France. In exchange, Britain would accept an equivalent number of eligible asylum seekers who had applied through legal routes and had qualifying family connections in the UK.
The government hoped that the arrangement would weaken the business model of people-smuggling gangs.
The underlying idea was relatively straightforward: if migrants understood that arriving in Britain illegally could result in their immediate return to France, fewer people might be willing to risk the dangerous Channel crossing.
At the same time, the legal route would provide an alternative for certain asylum seekers with family connections in Britain.
When the agreement was announced, Starmer presented it as an important development in cross-Channel cooperation.
However, the scheme encountered operational difficulties, and the latest inspection has revealed that its effectiveness was limited by problems with the French return process.
France Rejected Up to Half of Britain’s Proposed Returns
One of the most damaging findings concerns the number of migrants whom France refused to accept.
According to the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, John Tuckett, French authorities did not provide sufficiently transparent explanations for their decisions to reject individuals referred through the return process.
The inspection found that the criteria used by French authorities were not sufficiently clear to British officials.
Although the agreement required France to provide information about refusals, data-protection restrictions meant that the information supplied was anonymised.
This made it difficult for Home Office officials to understand precisely why individual cases had been rejected.
The consequences were significant.
British officials could spend considerable time preparing cases for deportation only to discover that France would not accept the individuals concerned.
The inspector warned that refusal rates had reached as high as 50 per cent.
This created an inefficient process in which administrative resources were spent preparing returns that ultimately could not take place.
The findings have raised questions about whether the government properly understood the practical difficulties involved before presenting the agreement as a major solution to the small-boats crisis.
The central problem was not simply the number of people arriving in Britain. It was also the government’s ability to secure agreement from France to accept those selected for removal.
More Than 1,600 Migrants Returned to France
Despite the difficulties, the agreement did produce some returns.
According to figures cited in the reporting, approximately 1,631 migrants were returned to France under the scheme, while Britain accepted around 1,496 people through the corresponding legal route.
These figures demonstrate that the arrangement was operational, even though it did not achieve the scale originally anticipated.
Officials had hoped to increase returns to approximately 100 people per week by May 2026. However, the Home Office failed to reach that target.
The inspector revealed that preparations for increasing the number of charter flights were already running approximately two weeks behind schedule in early May.
The government also faced practical restrictions involving detention capacity, transport arrangements and the availability of staff.
These problems meant that the scheme struggled to expand sufficiently to become the deterrent ministers had hoped for.
The financial implications have also attracted criticism. Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood previously told MPs that each return to France was costing approximately £56,000.
She defended the expenditure by comparing it with the cost of accommodating an asylum seeker in a hotel for a year.
Nevertheless, the figure raises questions about value for money, particularly when the government was unable to achieve its original target for weekly removals.
For taxpayers, the important issue is whether the money spent on the scheme produced sufficient results to justify its continuation.
France Refuses to Continue the Agreement
Another major setback came when France indicated that it did not want to continue the bilateral arrangement beyond its initial period.
The agreement was originally designed as a pilot scheme, with an extension taking it until 1 October 2026.
However, French Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez argued that France should not be expected to carry the responsibility for controlling irregular migration across Europe’s external borders on its own.
Paris wanted Britain to negotiate a broader agreement with the European Union rather than relying exclusively on a bilateral arrangement.
Nuñez suggested that a European-wide framework would provide a more comprehensive approach to migrant returns.
This position created difficulties for the British government because an EU-wide agreement would involve negotiations with multiple European governments and institutions.
France’s position also highlighted the consequences of Brexit.
Before Britain’s departure from the EU, the Dublin system provided a framework for determining which member state was responsible for examining certain asylum applications and transferring asylum seekers between participating countries.
However, Britain no longer participates in that system.
The government has therefore had to negotiate alternative arrangements to facilitate returns.
France’s reluctance to continue the existing agreement demonstrates how difficult it can be for Britain to establish effective migration cooperation outside the European Union.
The end of Operation Hillmore’s pilot phase on 1 October was consequently a significant development in the government’s immigration strategy.
Official Investigation Identifies Serious Weaknesses
The Independent Chief Inspector’s report, published on 10 November 2026, provides a more detailed assessment of the scheme.
Importantly, the report did not conclude that the entire arrangement was unsuccessful.
Instead, it found that the pilot demonstrated that a reciprocal agreement between Britain and France could be established and operated using existing legal and administrative procedures.
The inspector also recognised the importance of strong leadership and the availability of resources within the Home Office.
However, the report identified a fundamental weakness: the government had failed to establish sufficiently clear criteria for measuring the scheme’s overall success.
Its stated objective was to discourage migrants from making dangerous journeys across the Channel.
Yet crossings are influenced by numerous factors, including weather conditions, police operations, smuggling networks and conditions in migrants’ countries of origin.
Without clear evaluation criteria, it is difficult to establish precisely how much the agreement itself contributed to changes in crossing numbers.
The inspector made three recommendations aimed at improving the design, implementation and evaluation of future Home Office pilot schemes.
The Home Office accepted all three recommendations.
This finding is important because it suggests that the government needs to improve not only its migration policies but also the way it measures whether those policies are working.
Small Boat Crossings Remain a Major Political Problem
The controversy comes against a background of continuing concern about irregular migration across the English Channel.
According to figures reported in September 2026, approximately 19,135 people had crossed the Channel in small boats between January and 27 September.
This represented a reduction of approximately 42 per cent compared with the same period in 2025.
The decline is significant, although it cannot automatically be attributed to the one-in-one-out agreement.
Other factors, including increased French police patrols, surveillance operations and changing weather conditions, may also have influenced crossing numbers.
The British and French authorities have continued to cooperate on preventing dangerous journeys.
The British government has also sought to strengthen enforcement against people-smuggling organisations, which frequently exploit vulnerable individuals by charging substantial sums for dangerous transportation.
However, stopping crossings requires more than increasing police patrols.
Authorities must also address the criminal networks organising journeys, improve intelligence-sharing and develop effective procedures for removing people who have no legal right to remain in Britain.
The latest controversy demonstrates that cooperation between the two countries remains essential.
Neither government can completely control the situation without considering the actions and policies of its neighbour.
Political Pressure Mounts on Labour
The revelations have provided opposition politicians with further opportunities to criticise Labour’s immigration strategy.
The Conservative Party and Reform UK have repeatedly argued that the government has failed to establish sufficiently effective arrangements for preventing irregular Channel crossings.
For Reform UK, the controversy reinforces its argument that Britain needs stronger border enforcement and a more effective system for removing people who arrive illegally.
Conservative critics have also questioned whether the government placed too much confidence in an agreement that depended heavily on French cooperation.
Labour, meanwhile, can point to the number of migrants actually returned and the reduction in crossings recorded during parts of 2026.
The government can also argue that the agreement established a practical mechanism that had not previously existed in the same form.
Nevertheless, the failure to reach the planned weekly return target and France’s decision not to continue the pilot arrangement create legitimate questions about its long-term effectiveness.
Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood must now demonstrate how the government intends to replace or improve the arrangement.
The political challenge is particularly difficult because immigration has become one of the most closely watched issues in British politics.
Voters are concerned about border security, the cost of accommodation, the asylum system and the government’s ability to enforce immigration law.
The government will therefore face continued scrutiny over whether its policies produce measurable improvements.
Conclusion: A Costly Lesson in Britain-France Migration Cooperation
The collapse of the one-in-one-out pilot represents an important setback for Labour’s attempt to tackle small-boat migration through cooperation with France.
The agreement achieved some practical results, returning more than 1,600 migrants, but it failed to reach its intended weekly target and encountered substantial administrative difficulties.
The revelation that France rejected up to half of some proposed returns has exposed weaknesses in the system, particularly the lack of transparency surrounding French refusal decisions.
France’s unwillingness to continue the bilateral arrangement has created another challenge for Britain, which must now consider whether a broader agreement with the European Union could provide a more sustainable solution.
However, an EU-wide arrangement would not automatically resolve the Channel migration problem. As Mahmood has acknowledged, European countries themselves face considerable difficulties returning people whose asylum applications have been rejected.
Ultimately, the government’s experience demonstrates that announcing an agreement is much easier than making it work effectively.
For Labour, the real test is whether it can turn the lessons of Operation Hillmore into a credible and sustainable border strategy.
For migrants, the priority must remain preventing dangerous journeys and ensuring that asylum claims are handled fairly. For British taxpayers, the government must demonstrate that public money is being spent effectively. And for both Britain and France, closer cooperation will remain essential if they are to tackle the criminal networks exploiting vulnerable people.
The latest revelations may be described by political opponents as a dismal failure, but the official findings present a more complicated picture: a functioning pilot with real returns, serious operational weaknesses and no convincing evidence that it achieved its central deterrence objective.