Labour hoped the France deal would deter migrants (Image: Getty)
France refused to take back up to half of the migrants Britain wanted to boot out under Keir Starmer’s one-in-one-out deal, it emerged today. The former Prime Minister insisted the deal would help end small boat crossings, when it was announced in 2025. But France simply refused to accept many of the cross-Channel migrants that were supposed to be returned to its territory, according to a scathing watchdog report.
The scale of the failure was laid bare by John Tuckett, the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. He said Paris hid behind data protection diktats to avoid handing immigration officials the reasons for refusals – which meant the Home Office wasted time trying to return migrants that France would eventually reject.
The arrangement ended in October because France refused to sign a new agreement, insisting instead that Downing Street should sign a pact with the EU as a whole.
Mr Tuckett said: “The criteria and basis on which the French authorities accepted or rejected individuals referred under the OUT route were not transparent to UK caseworkers.
“The Agreement requires regular reporting from France on reasons for refusal, but this is anonymised, given various legal restrictions on sharing personal data for the purposes of the Agreement.
“This limited the ability of Home Office officials to manage and improve the process. This is the critical rate-determining step for the OUT route and comes towards the end of the process.
“Further clarity in this area would avoid nugatory effort and resources being spent in preparing cohorts where the refusal rate has been as high as 50%.”
Some 1,631 migrants were returned under the scheme, while Britain accepted 1,496.
Officials privately hoped to remove 100 people a week by May. But the Home Office never hit this number.
Mr Tuckett said: “A ‘roadmap to 100’ delivery plan started in February 2026 anticipated 100 returns per week from mid-May, sustaining that number for four weeks.
“In early May 2026, the ramp-up to two charter return flights per week was running approximately two weeks behind schedule, and the pilot had not yet achieved its 100 returns per week target, nor sustained that level for any period.”
The inspector’s bombshell report comes after 21 people successfully crossed the Channel without being intercepted, reaching the Kent coast.
It is the third this year, prompting renewed fears over Britain’s border security.
The cohort arrived at Samphire Hoe, Kent, and were met by officers.
Shabana Mahmood hoped for more from the France deal (Image: Getty)
Mr Tuckett’s comments confirm allegations made by a senior whistleblower in an exclusive investigation by the Daily Express in May.
A source told us: “At this stage, we would want to be returning 200 a week.”
Referring to Operation Hillmore, the official name of the “one in, one out” deal, the source said: “We are returning 30. We can only detain 75 new arrivals. So, if we are only removing 30 people, Operation Hillmore isn’t a deterrent.
“We need more resources. Detention spaces, charter aircraft spaces to get people out and more cooperation with the French, but they are their own sovereign nation.
“They don’t want these people there, even if Britain pays them for it.
“There’s no reason to believe overall flows of migration will be any lower than they have been in the previous years. I just don’t think they realised what the blockages were.
“They weren’t listening to the staff who were telling them.”
Labour’s Small Boats Deal Was a Dismal Failure as France ‘Refused to Take Back Migrants’
The Labour government’s flagship agreement with France to tackle illegal Channel crossings has come under intense scrutiny after the scheme struggled to deliver the results ministers had promised. What was originally presented as a major breakthrough in Britain’s fight against people-smuggling gangs has instead become a source of political embarrassment, with relatively small numbers of migrants returned to France and serious disagreements emerging between the two governments. The controversial ‘one in, one out’ arrangement was supposed to discourage dangerous small-boat journeys by demonstrating that people arriving illegally could be sent back across the Channel. However, the scheme encountered operational difficulties, France became increasingly reluctant to continue the arrangement on the existing terms, and the agreement stopped accepting new cases in October 2026. For the Labour government, the developments raise uncomfortable questions about its ability to deliver on one of its most important election promises: restoring control over Britain’s borders.
The agreement was announced in July 2025 following discussions between Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron. Its central principle was relatively straightforward. Britain would return certain migrants who had crossed the English Channel in small boats to France, while accepting an equivalent number of eligible asylum seekers from France through a legal route. The government hoped that this arrangement would undermine the financial incentives behind people-smuggling operations and discourage others from attempting the dangerous journey.
At the time, ministers described the agreement as a groundbreaking development. They argued that returning migrants to France would send a powerful message to criminal gangs and those considering paying thousands of pounds to travel across the Channel.
However, turning a political announcement into an effective operational system proved considerably more difficult.
One of the biggest problems was the limited number of people who could actually be returned. According to reports published when the scheme ended, approximately 1,500 asylum seekers had been returned to France during its operation, with a broadly similar number entering Britain legally through the reciprocal arrangement.
Although these returns represented a new form of cooperation between the two countries, the numbers were relatively small compared with the total number of people arriving in Britain by small boat. More than 40,000 people crossed the Channel during the period in which the agreement operated.
This raised an important question: could a scheme returning a relatively small proportion of arrivals realistically deter the wider movement of people attempting to reach Britain?
The government had hoped that the possibility of immediate removal would discourage migrants from making the journey. Yet the limited scale of the programme made it difficult to establish whether the deterrent effect was substantial.
The situation became even more complicated when France indicated that it was unwilling to continue the agreement indefinitely. French officials wanted a broader European approach, arguing that France should not be expected to shoulder responsibility for controlling irregular migration towards Britain on its own.
French Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez made clear that Paris wanted the issue considered within a wider agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union.
This was a significant diplomatic development. Britain had negotiated a bilateral arrangement intended to demonstrate that cooperation with France could help solve the Channel crisis. Yet the French government increasingly favoured a wider European framework rather than continuing the existing scheme on its original terms.
For Labour, this created a difficult situation. Ministers needed French cooperation to make the agreement work, but Britain had limited ability to dictate the conditions under which France would accept returned migrants.
The arrangement officially stopped processing new cases at the beginning of October 2026, although flights involving people already detained under the programme continued for a period afterwards.
Another major concern involved the financial cost. Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood told MPs that the cost was approximately £56,000 for every person returned to France. This figure prompted further questions about whether the scheme offered sufficient value for money.
Taxpayers understandably want to know whether expensive immigration policies are delivering measurable results. Every pound spent on border enforcement must be justified, particularly when the government is simultaneously facing pressure to fund the NHS, housing, education and other essential services.
The financial question becomes even more important when the relatively small number of returns is compared with the scale of Channel crossings.
However, the cost of the scheme should also be considered alongside its wider objectives, including establishing a functioning returns mechanism and testing whether a reciprocal arrangement could operate in practice. An independent inspection later found that the system demonstrated operational viability, although its contribution to reducing crossings was difficult to establish.
The problems were not limited to financial considerations. There were also disagreements over the practical arrangements for accepting returned migrants.
France rejected some referrals under the agreement, with refusal rates reaching 50 per cent in certain groups of cases, according to an inspection of the programme. This created further difficulties for British officials attempting to organise removals.
The reasons for these refusals were not always sufficiently clear, making it harder for the Home Office to identify problems and improve the process.
There were also concerns about detention capacity, legal challenges and the arrangements needed to ensure that people returned to France were treated appropriately.
These complications demonstrate how difficult it can be to establish an effective international returns agreement. Governments must consider immigration law, individual asylum claims, human rights obligations, identification procedures and the practical availability of detention and transport facilities.
Meanwhile, the number of people attempting to cross the Channel remained a major political issue.
The government has argued that crossings fell significantly during parts of 2026 compared with the previous year. However, ministers have also acknowledged that it is difficult to establish exactly how much of that reduction resulted from the agreement with France.
Weather conditions, enforcement operations, changes in smuggling networks and wider migration patterns can all influence the number of attempted crossings.
An independent inspection published in November 2026 highlighted precisely this problem. Inspectors found that the pilot lacked sufficiently clear criteria for measuring its overall success. Although the operational arrangements had been established, there was insufficient evidence to determine how much the programme had contributed to reducing small-boat arrivals.
The report also raised concerns about the absence of a comprehensive value-for-money assessment.
This is an important criticism because the government originally presented the agreement as a way to discourage dangerous crossings and undermine criminal networks. Without clear performance measurements, it becomes difficult to establish whether the policy achieved those objectives.
There is also a humanitarian dimension that cannot be ignored. Many people arriving in small boats are seeking asylum and may have fled war, persecution or serious instability in their home countries. Their claims must be assessed individually and in accordance with British and international law.
Critics of the returns scheme have raised concerns about the treatment of vulnerable individuals, including potential victims of trafficking and torture. They argue that legal advice and proper safeguarding arrangements must be available before removals take place.
The government therefore faces two responsibilities: maintaining effective border controls while ensuring that people seeking international protection are treated lawfully and humanely.
Neither objective should be sacrificed.
For Labour, the political consequences are significant. Starmer came to power promising to tackle the criminal gangs organising dangerous Channel crossings. The government abandoned the previous Conservative Rwanda policy and instead pursued closer cooperation with France, presenting its approach as a more practical alternative.
The end of the pilot now raises questions about what comes next.
Ministers have indicated that lessons from the scheme will inform future enforcement arrangements. They have also promised to continue working with France to disrupt smuggling networks, improve intelligence-sharing and increase removals of people who have no legal right to remain in Britain.
However, the government must explain how these measures will achieve better results than the previous arrangement.
Nigel Farage and Reform UK are likely to use the controversy to challenge Labour’s immigration record. Reform has consistently argued that Britain needs much stronger border enforcement and a more effective system for removing people who have no right to remain.
The Conservatives have also criticised the government’s approach, questioning whether ministers have delivered meaningful improvements despite substantial public expenditure.
Nevertheless, the end of the agreement does not mean cooperation between Britain and France has ended. Both governments continue to recognise that people-smuggling networks operate internationally and that effective enforcement requires cooperation across borders.
The real challenge is finding an arrangement that both countries are willing and able to implement.
Ultimately, the small-boats crisis cannot be solved through announcements and political slogans. It requires effective investigations into criminal networks, faster asylum decisions, lawful removals, international cooperation and stronger protection against dangerous crossings.
The Labour government must now demonstrate that it has a credible strategy capable of delivering measurable results.
In conclusion, the end of the UK-France ‘one in, one out’ agreement has exposed significant weaknesses in Labour’s approach to tackling small-boat migration. The scheme established a mechanism for returning some migrants to France, but the numbers remained limited, the financial costs attracted scrutiny and disagreements with Paris prevented the arrangement from continuing on its original terms. France wanted a broader European approach, while British officials struggled to expand the programme to the scale originally envisaged. An independent inspection also questioned whether the scheme’s overall impact could be properly measured. These developments present a serious challenge for the Labour government, which must now explain how it intends to deliver more effective border enforcement. British taxpayers deserve transparency over the money spent, while communities affected by irregular migration want reassurance that the government has a workable plan. At the same time, asylum claims must continue to receive lawful and fair consideration. The failure to establish a lasting agreement does not remove the need for cooperation with France. It does, however, demonstrate that ambitious political promises must be supported by practical arrangements, clear targets and measurable results. The government’s next approach will be judged not by its announcements, but by whether it can genuinely reduce dangerous crossings and restore public confidence in Britain’s immigration system.