I suspect the majority would plump for her politically disastrous decision to scrap the winter fuel payment for 10million pensioners within weeks of the July 2024 election, which crushed Labour’s popularity at a stroke. It was designed to make her look tough, an iron Chancellor, but her reputation turned to rust when she was forced into a humiliating U-turn. But I don’t think that was her worst mistake.

For me, it was slapping a £25billion tax on employing people. Reeves didn’t just hike the National Insurance rate employers pay on staff, she designed it so the burden fell on lower paid and younger workers. Youth unemployment has since rocketed by around 120,000 and is still rising. This is ruining young lives, not to mention our high streets.

There are a string of other contenders, such as Reeves’s campaign of doom before her maiden Budget, and the chaos surrounding her second, when she floated a controversial 2p income tax rise then quickly did another U-turn, while a mass of leaks turned the whole thing into a right old mess. There are many more but I don’t have space. I’d love to see new chancellor John Healey reverse her biggest errors in his upcoming Budget on October 28.

He could start by scrapping her decision to slap inheritance tax on unused pension pots, which comes into force next April. This will deter people from saving for a pension, as families could end up losing up to two thirds to HMRC if policyholders die at the wrong time. It will also pile the administrative burden on grieving families, who must sort out all the IHT due within six months, with penalties if they don’t.

Healey should also clear up her Cash ISA rule fiddle, which is another mess, and scrap her inheritance tax raid on family businesses. I’ve heard heart-rending stories of people who may have to sell businesses they spent generations building, to pay inheritance tax on wealth tied up in the company. It isn’t money sitting in their bank accounts. Reeves greedily went after it anyway. Healey should put a stop to that too.

There’s a reason Reeves was voted the worst of the last five chancellors in a recent poll. And I haven’t even mentioned her ignorant and disastrous inheritance tax raid on family farms, which caused fury and dismay across rural communities. This is another main contender for her most brainless move.

Family farms often have to pass to the next generation because they’re the only people who understand them well enough to keep them going. But that never seemed to occur to Reeves. I sometimes wonder if the only thing she knows about the countryside is that Harry and Meghan live there.

She was forced into another humiliating U-turn but the threat lingers. I’m now crossing my fingers, having read reports that Healey wants to scrap her family farms raid altogether.

I’d love Healey to come through for farmers. But there’s a problem. He’s in a total mess, with his fiscal headroom disappearing by the day. There’s even talk he’ll have to hike taxes by £35billion just to balance the books. She’s left him in a complete hole. Which is stopping him from reversing policies he knows are ridiculous. It’s the final slap in the face for our new chancellor.

If anybody in the Treasury is reading this, please, please, please do the right thing by farmers. It’ll give us something to cheer amid the misery fest to come, and reverse one of Reeves’s biggest blunders. Unfortunately, thanks to the mess she left, her policy may yet win through. And farmers will be the losers. But then, we all are.

Rachel Reeves Left John Healey in a Hole – and Her Final Decision Has Added to the Defence Spending Row

Britain’s defence spending debate has exposed a serious disagreement at the heart of government, with Rachel Reeves’s cautious approach to public finances clashing with John Healey’s demands for greater investment in the armed forces. The dispute has raised questions about how the United Kingdom intends to meet its military commitments while balancing the Treasury’s determination to control spending.

The row became particularly dramatic in June 2026, when Healey resigned as defence secretary after arguing that the government’s defence investment plans did not provide the resources required to meet the country’s security challenges. In his resignation letter, he accused Prime Minister Keir Starmer of being unable to secure the necessary funding and said the Treasury had been unwilling to commit the resources he believed were needed. <Cite refs={[“turn231306search3″,”turn231306search5”]}/>

The disagreement was not simply a clash between two ministers with different priorities. It highlighted a fundamental problem facing the government: how can Britain promise stronger national defence, maintain public services and avoid putting additional pressure on public finances when all three objectives require substantial resources?

For Healey, the issue was the readiness of Britain’s armed forces. For Reeves, the challenge was finding a credible way to finance competing demands without undermining the government’s fiscal commitments.

The consequences of that disagreement continue to shape the debate over Britain’s military future.

A dispute over billions of pounds

The immediate conflict centred on the funding required to deliver the government’s defence investment plan.

The Ministry of Defence sought a larger financial settlement to address gaps in major projects and provide the equipment, ammunition and capabilities that military leaders considered necessary. Reports at the time indicated that Healey wanted approximately £18bn in additional funding over four years, while the settlement negotiated with the Treasury amounted to around £13.5bn.

That left a substantial difference between the department’s request and the money ultimately offered. Healey regarded the settlement as insufficient, particularly given the deteriorating international security environment and the commitments Britain had made to its NATO allies. <Cite refs={[“turn231306search3″,”turn231306search4”]}/>

The disagreement was complicated by the fact that defence spending does not operate in isolation. Increasing the Ministry of Defence budget means finding additional revenue, reducing expenditure elsewhere or borrowing more.

Each option carries consequences.

Tax increases can place pressure on households and businesses. Spending reductions can affect public services and investment projects. Additional borrowing can increase debt-servicing costs, particularly when financial markets are concerned about the government’s long-term plans.

Reeves therefore faced a difficult decision. She had to consider the military’s requirements while protecting the Treasury’s wider financial objectives.

However, Healey argued that caution could carry its own risks. If the armed forces lacked sufficient resources, the government could struggle to maintain readiness and fulfil its commitments in a more dangerous international environment.

That was the central disagreement: how much risk Britain could reasonably accept in order to preserve fiscal discipline.

Why John Healey believed the plan fell short

Healey’s objections were rooted in his assessment of the military challenges confronting Britain.

European security has changed substantially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. NATO members have been reviewing their military capabilities, replenishing ammunition stocks and considering how to respond to the possibility of a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Britain has also made commitments to strengthen its defence capabilities over the coming years. Meeting those commitments requires more than announcing a percentage of gross domestic product that the country intends to spend. It requires decisions about equipment, personnel, infrastructure, maintenance and the ability to deploy forces when needed.

Healey argued that the government’s proposed settlement did not provide a sufficiently clear or ambitious path towards the level of investment he considered necessary.

He also warned that inadequate funding could force the armed forces to make difficult choices about readiness and operational activity. In his resignation statement to Parliament, he called for a clear target of spending 3% of GDP on defence by 2030, followed by a path towards 3.5% in 2035. <Cite refs={[“turn231306search7″,”turn231306search12”]}/>

His position reflected a wider concern among defence advocates: military capability cannot always be expanded quickly when an international crisis emerges. Training takes time, equipment orders can take years to fulfil, and rebuilding depleted stockpiles requires long-term planning.

From this perspective, delaying investment may save money in the short term while creating more expensive problems later.

Nevertheless, the government’s position was that defence spending must be considered alongside the condition of the public finances and the Ministry of Defence’s own record of managing major projects.

The argument was therefore not simply about whether defence mattered. It was about the amount of money required, the speed at which it should be provided and how the government should pay for it.

Rachel Reeves faces the cost of competing promises

Reeves’s approach reflects a longstanding Treasury concern: governments cannot make unlimited spending commitments without identifying sustainable sources of funding.

Britain’s public finances have faced pressure from debt interest, public service demand, sluggish productivity and the rising cost of several major government programmes. Any additional defence settlement must be considered within that wider context.

The Treasury’s reluctance to provide every pound requested by the Ministry of Defence was therefore part of a broader argument about priorities.

The government had already promised investment in public services and infrastructure while seeking to maintain confidence in its fiscal rules. Increasing defence expenditure could require reductions elsewhere or a different approach to taxation and borrowing.

That creates a difficult political calculation. Cutting investment in transport, energy or other public infrastructure could undermine economic growth. Reducing spending on public services could lead to further pressure on already stretched systems. Raising taxes could prove unpopular, while borrowing more could increase the government’s exposure to higher interest rates.

There is no cost-free solution.

Critics of Reeves argue that the government cannot repeatedly announce ambitious national commitments while leaving departments to negotiate over whether the necessary funding will actually be available. They contend that defence planning requires predictable resources, particularly when equipment programmes and international commitments extend over many years.

Defenders of Treasury caution, however, argue that the Ministry of Defence must demonstrate that additional funding can be spent effectively. Large projects have experienced delays and cost overruns, and simply increasing a budget does not guarantee that the armed forces will receive the capabilities they need.

Both concerns are relevant to the public debate. The challenge is to establish a funding plan that is financially credible while delivering the military capability the government says Britain requires.

The wider consequences for Britain’s armed forces

The dispute has consequences beyond Westminster.

Military readiness depends on a complex system of people, equipment, training and support. Ships must be maintained, aircraft require spare parts, personnel need regular training and ammunition stocks must be replenished. Delays in one area can affect the effectiveness of an entire operation.

A defence budget that is insufficiently aligned with operational needs can therefore create difficult decisions for military commanders.

The government must decide which programmes receive priority, which capabilities can be expanded quickly and which investments may have to wait. It must also ensure that long-term projects do not consume resources needed for immediate readiness.

The defence investment plan was intended to provide a framework for major capital projects and future capabilities. The controversy surrounding its funding demonstrated how difficult it can be to reconcile that ambition with competing fiscal pressures.

There is also a broader question about credibility. NATO commitments carry strategic significance because allies must be confident that one another will contribute to collective security. Announcing targets without a clear funding path can create uncertainty about whether political promises will translate into practical military capabilities.

At the same time, spending targets should not be treated as the only measure of defence effectiveness. The quality of procurement, the availability of equipment and the ability to deploy forces are also important.

The government’s task is to connect its spending commitments to a credible plan for improving those outcomes.

The final insult: a funding gap that will not disappear

The political argument has continued beyond Healey’s resignation. Subsequent reporting on the defence investment plan indicated that the government still faced a funding gap of approximately £4.7bn over four years, adding another complication for the administration that followed the initial dispute. <Cite refs={[“turn231306search6”]}/>

That shortfall matters because a plan can be approved politically without every element being fully funded at the point of announcement. If the money must be found later, future ministers may face difficult choices over taxation, borrowing or reductions in other areas of expenditure.

Critics can therefore argue that the government has passed a financial problem into the future rather than resolving it.

Supporters of a phased approach may respond that spending plans can legitimately be refined as economic conditions and departmental requirements change. They may also argue that it is better to establish a framework and improve it over time than to commit money without adequate scrutiny.

The central issue is transparency. Parliament and the public need to understand which elements of the defence programme are funded, which remain uncertain and what assumptions underpin the government’s plans.

Without that clarity, disagreement over defence spending risks becoming a recurring political crisis rather than a constructive debate about national security.

A difficult balance between security and fiscal discipline

The confrontation between Reeves and Healey illustrates a dilemma that extends well beyond the Labour Party.

Britain faces demands for stronger defence at a time when public finances remain constrained. The government must respond to security concerns while maintaining public services and supporting economic growth.

Healey’s resignation drew attention to the potential consequences of underfunding the armed forces. Reeves’s position highlighted the financial decisions that must accompany any expansion of military commitments.

Neither problem can be solved by rhetoric alone.

A credible defence strategy requires a realistic assessment of threats, a clear understanding of the capabilities required and a transparent timetable for providing them. It must also explain how those investments will be financed without creating unsustainable pressures elsewhere in the public sector.

The government should be judged not merely on the size of its spending announcements, but on whether the armed forces receive the resources they need and whether those resources are used effectively.

What happens next?

The lasting question is whether Britain can establish a defence funding framework that commands confidence across government and provides greater certainty for military planners.

That would require the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence to agree on priorities, identify realistic costs and explain how the programme will be delivered over time. It would also require ministers to acknowledge the trade-offs involved rather than presenting every ambition as though it could be achieved without difficult choices.

For Healey, the dispute became a matter of principle, culminating in his resignation. For Reeves, it illustrated the limits of the Treasury’s ability to reconcile growing demands with strict financial constraints.

The episode has also placed responsibility on the wider government. Defence policy cannot be determined solely by the Treasury’s immediate budget calculations, but military spending cannot be separated from the economic conditions that sustain it.

Ultimately, national security and fiscal responsibility must be considered together. Britain needs armed forces that can respond to the threats they face, alongside a financial plan that can sustain those capabilities.

The controversy surrounding Rachel Reeves and John Healey has exposed how difficult that balance can be. Whether the government can resolve the underlying funding problems will matter far more than the political arguments that brought them into public view.