Andy Burham’s Brexit reset means giving away more of our money, fish and powers
Andy Burnham’s plans to reset Britain’s relationship with the European Union have triggered a fresh political confrontation, with critics warning that closer ties could come at a significant financial and constitutional cost.
Former Conservative minister Lord Redwood has delivered a blunt assessment of the proposals, arguing that Britain risks surrendering money, fishing opportunities and control over domestic legislation without securing meaningful benefits in return. His warning reflects a wider concern among Brexit supporters that a gradual shift towards European integration could reverse important elements of the 2016 referendum without giving voters a clear opportunity to reconsider the decision.
For Burnham, however, the debate presents a different challenge. Supporters of closer cooperation with Brussels argue that Britain’s departure from the EU has created practical obstacles for businesses and complicated cooperation in areas where neighbouring countries share common interests. They believe a carefully negotiated reset could improve economic relationships without necessarily requiring the UK to rejoin the bloc.
The central question is whether such an arrangement could deliver measurable advantages while preserving the political independence that Brexit supporters regard as essential.
Redwood believes the answer is no. In his assessment, the proposed reset risks becoming a gradual process of transferring powers back to Brussels, with the costs becoming apparent only after the agreements have been signed.
That is a serious political charge, although the consequences would depend on the precise terms of any agreement. A closer relationship with the EU could involve different combinations of financial contributions, regulatory alignment, market access and reciprocal commitments. Without a detailed proposal, it is not possible to establish that every concern raised by Redwood would necessarily materialise.
Andy Burnham wants to drag the UK closer to the EU (Image: PA)
Nevertheless, his intervention highlights the difficult choices facing Burnham as he attempts to define Britain’s future relationship with Europe.
Lord Redwood warns against reopening the Brexit settlement
Redwood’s criticism begins with the principle that the 2016 referendum should be treated as a decisive democratic choice.
Brexit supporters argue that voters were asked whether the UK should remain in or leave the European Union, and that the result established a mandate for a different relationship with the bloc. In their view, successive governments should focus on making the most of Britain’s independence rather than gradually reconstructing the arrangements that existed before departure.
Redwood accuses Burnham of looking backwards instead of concentrating on the country’s current economic challenges. He also challenges the Prime Minister’s interest in questions about possible Russian interference in the referendum, arguing that political leaders should accept the outcome and focus on using the freedoms available outside the EU.
The question of foreign interference, however, requires careful distinctions. Evidence that foreign actors attempted to influence a political debate is not automatically proof that they changed the outcome. Equally, the existence of a referendum result does not prevent governments from investigating legitimate concerns about electoral security.
The political disagreement is therefore about both evidence and what should follow from it.
For Brexit supporters, revisiting the circumstances of the referendum can appear to reopen a settled constitutional argument. For others, examining foreign influence and assessing the consequences of Brexit are legitimate parts of democratic accountability.
Burnham must navigate that tension without allowing historical disputes to overshadow the practical question of what Britain’s relationship with Europe should look like today.
The three routes towards closer ties with Brussels
Redwood identifies three broad possibilities: a gradual reset, a return to the EU customs union, and full membership of the European Union.
Although these options are sometimes discussed together, they would represent substantially different political and economic arrangements.
A reset could involve targeted agreements covering areas such as food standards, trade, energy, research or security. Depending on their design, such agreements might reduce friction for businesses while leaving the UK outside the EU’s central institutions.
A customs union would focus primarily on trade in goods. It would generally involve a common external tariff, limiting the UK’s ability to set independent tariffs on goods from countries outside the arrangement.
Full EU membership would be a much more extensive undertaking, involving the obligations and institutions associated with membership and requiring a negotiated accession process.
Redwood argues that all three options would undermine the benefits of Brexit. His concern is that the distinction between a limited practical agreement and a fundamental change in Britain’s political direction could gradually become blurred.
Supporters of a reset would dispute that conclusion. They could argue that cooperation in specific areas does not automatically amount to surrendering sovereignty and that the UK can negotiate arrangements designed to serve its own economic interests.
The real test would be the detail. Which rules would Britain accept? What payments, if any, would be required? How would disputes be resolved? What access would British firms gain in exchange?
Until those questions are answered, sweeping claims about the benefits or costs of a reset remain political arguments rather than settled conclusions.
Would Britain really have to give Brussels more money?
Financial contributions are among Redwood’s most prominent concerns.
EU membership involved contributions to the bloc’s budget, alongside receipts and other financial arrangements. After Brexit, the UK ceased making ordinary member-state contributions under the former system, although it remained responsible for financial obligations agreed as part of the withdrawal settlement.
A future agreement could involve additional payments, depending on the arrangement negotiated. Some forms of participation in EU programmes or access to particular structures may require financial contributions.
But a reset would not automatically mean that Britain had to resume paying the same sums it contributed as a member. The amount and purpose of any payment would depend on the agreement.
The relevant comparison is therefore not simply whether the UK would pay money to the EU. It is whether the costs would be justified by the benefits secured in return.
For example, a financial contribution associated with a specific programme might be considered worthwhile if it gave British universities, researchers or businesses access to opportunities that would otherwise be unavailable or more expensive to obtain.
Conversely, a payment that produced little practical benefit could be difficult to defend, particularly when the government is under pressure to fund domestic services.
Burnham would need to explain any proposed contribution transparently, including its expected benefits, conditions and alternatives. Voters should be able to assess the full arrangement rather than being asked to accept a headline promise of improved relations.
Redwood’s warning is ultimately about the danger of agreeing to new financial commitments without establishing whether the return represents good value for taxpayers.
Fishing rights remain a politically sensitive issue
The question of fishing has long carried significance beyond its direct contribution to the British economy.
For many coastal communities, fishing represents employment, local identity and the continuation of industries that have operated for generations. Brexit supporters argued that leaving the EU’s common fisheries arrangements would allow Britain to exercise greater control over its waters and determine how fishing opportunities should be allocated.
Redwood fears that a closer relationship with Brussels could involve giving away some of that control.
Any new fisheries agreement would need to address access to waters, the allocation of fishing opportunities, conservation requirements and the interests of coastal communities. The precise implications would depend on the terms negotiated.
There are potential economic trade-offs. Access arrangements can affect fishing fleets, seafood processors, exporters and the wider supply chain. Disputes over quotas and access can also influence relations with neighbouring European countries.
A government seeking closer cooperation with the EU might argue that predictable arrangements would help businesses plan and reduce the risk of recurring disputes. Opponents could counter that such benefits would not justify concessions over access to British waters.
Neither argument can be resolved by slogans alone.
If Burnham proposes changes affecting fishing, he would need to explain how they would affect British fleets, coastal employment, conservation and the distribution of economic benefits. He would also need to demonstrate why the proposed arrangement would be preferable to the existing settlement.
For communities that believed Brexit would restore national control over fishing, any perceived retreat would be politically sensitive.
The sovereignty argument: who makes Britain’s laws?
Redwood’s broader concern is that regulatory cooperation could gradually limit Britain’s freedom to establish its own rules.
Leaving the EU changed the legal relationship between the UK and the bloc. Britain gained the ability to diverge from EU rules in areas where it was no longer bound by membership obligations, although that freedom can involve trade-offs when businesses want to sell into European markets.
A future agreement could require the UK to align with particular standards in exchange for access or reduced administrative barriers. Such alignment would not necessarily apply to every part of the British economy, and the scope would depend on the agreement.
This creates a familiar dilemma.
If British businesses must comply with EU requirements to sell certain products in Europe, adopting compatible domestic standards might reduce duplication. But if Britain follows rules without having a meaningful role in deciding them, critics may argue that it has accepted obligations without equivalent influence.
Supporters of closer cooperation might respond that countries routinely accept international standards and negotiated obligations when doing so serves their interests. Sovereignty does not necessarily mean avoiding every shared rule; it can also mean choosing to enter agreements that deliver practical benefits.
The important distinction is between voluntarily accepting a defined set of obligations and automatically following an expanding body of rules without sufficient democratic scrutiny.
Burnham would need to clarify how any proposed arrangement would operate, which rules Britain would follow and what safeguards would prevent unwanted obligations from expanding beyond the agreed scope.
Without that clarity, the debate risks becoming a confrontation between competing abstract definitions of sovereignty rather than a serious assessment of policy.
Could a customs union make British goods more expensive?
Redwood is particularly hostile to the idea of returning to a customs union with the EU.
A customs union generally removes tariffs on trade between participating members and applies a common external tariff to goods entering from outside the arrangement. Its precise effects depend on the design of the agreement and the products involved.
The UK already has tariff-free trade in qualifying goods with the EU under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, subject to the agreement’s rules, including requirements concerning the origin of products.
Redwood argues that a customs union could reduce Britain’s ability to negotiate independent tariff arrangements with non-EU countries. He also warns that tariffs on goods imported from outside the bloc could increase costs for consumers and manufacturers.
That concern deserves consideration, particularly for industries that depend on components, raw materials or finished goods sourced from international suppliers.
However, the effects would vary. A common external tariff could increase the cost of some imports, while changes to customs procedures or market access might benefit particular businesses. The overall impact would depend on the products covered, the tariffs applied and any additional arrangements negotiated.
A customs union could also reduce certain barriers to trade with the EU, although the extent of the benefit would depend on the specific agreement.
The policy question is whether those potential advantages would outweigh the loss of independent tariff-setting powers and any additional costs for non-EU trade.
Britain’s trading relationships extend well beyond Europe. Any decision to change its customs arrangements should therefore be assessed against the interests of manufacturers, importers, exporters and consumers across the economy.
What about Britain’s independent trade deals?
One of the principal arguments for Brexit was that Britain would be able to set its own trade policy and negotiate agreements with countries around the world.
Since leaving the EU, the UK has pursued independent trade arrangements, although the value of individual agreements varies and should be judged against their actual economic effects rather than their existence alone.
Redwood argues that returning to a customs union could constrain Britain’s ability to strike independent tariff deals because members generally apply a common external tariff and follow a shared commercial policy for covered goods.
This is an important distinction between a customs union and a broader free-trade agreement. A free-trade agreement can reduce or eliminate tariffs between participating countries while allowing each party to maintain its own external tariff arrangements, subject to the agreement’s terms.
For British businesses, the implications could be significant. A company importing materials from Asia or North America may be affected by tariffs and rules governing the origin of goods. A manufacturer exporting to the EU may be more concerned about regulatory barriers, documentation and supply-chain delays.
There is no single arrangement that will necessarily maximise the interests of every sector.
A government must weigh the benefits of easier access to one market against the flexibility to negotiate with others. It should also consider whether proposed changes would create new costs for industries that have already adapted to the current trading system.
Burnham’s task would be to demonstrate how closer ties with the EU could improve Britain’s overall trading position rather than simply shifting costs between different parts of the economy.
Would rejoining the EU be realistic?
Full EU membership would represent the most extensive option discussed in the debate.
Redwood argues that rejoining would be politically difficult and potentially costly. He believes Britain would not be offered the same terms it previously enjoyed, including the former budget rebate, and raises the possibility that the UK could face additional obligations under the membership framework.
Any application to rejoin would require negotiation with the EU and agreement among its member states under the applicable accession process. Britain could not simply resume its former membership on demand.
The terms would need to be negotiated, and it would be inappropriate to treat specific future conditions as certain before those negotiations occurred.
Questions about the euro, budget contributions, regulatory obligations and the terms of membership would all be central to any serious proposal. The precise outcome would depend on the negotiations and the positions adopted by the UK and EU governments.
There would also be a domestic political question. A future government would have to consider whether it had a sufficiently clear public mandate for such a major change and how it would address the divisions that remain over Brexit.
For now, closer cooperation should not automatically be equated with a plan to rejoin. A government can pursue specific agreements without proposing full membership.
That distinction is essential if the public is to understand what Burnham is actually advocating.
The economic debate cannot be settled by slogans
The argument over Brexit’s economic consequences remains deeply contested.
Critics of leaving the EU point to trade friction, administrative burdens and uncertainty affecting some businesses. Supporters argue that the UK has gained regulatory and trade-policy flexibility and should focus on exploiting those opportunities rather than revisiting the decision.
Both sides can identify sectors that have benefited from particular arrangements and others that have faced difficulties. The wider economic impact depends on numerous factors, including domestic productivity, investment, global demand, labour supply and government policy.
It would therefore be misleading to suggest that any single change in the UK-EU relationship would automatically solve Britain’s economic problems.
Likewise, it would be too simplistic to conclude that every agreement with Brussels must damage British prosperity.
The practical question is whether a particular proposal produces identifiable gains that justify its financial and regulatory costs. That assessment requires credible economic analysis, transparent assumptions and consideration of alternative policies.
If Burnham believes a reset would improve growth, he should identify the mechanisms through which that growth would occur and explain how the benefits would be measured.
If Redwood believes the proposals would damage the economy, his claims should also be evaluated against the specific arrangements under discussion rather than accepted solely because they align with a broader opposition to European integration.
The political risk for Burnham
The Brexit debate presents Burnham with a difficult political calculation.
A more cooperative approach to the EU may appeal to voters who believe Britain’s current arrangements are unnecessarily restrictive. It could also create opportunities for businesses seeking simpler trading relationships and closer collaboration in selected areas.
At the same time, any perception that the government is reversing Brexit without an explicit mandate could alienate voters who regard the referendum as a decisive democratic choice.
The danger is that an attempt to appeal to both groups produces a message that satisfies neither. Pro-European voters may want a more ambitious change, while Brexit supporters may regard even limited concessions as a step too far.
The government therefore needs to be precise about its objectives.
It should distinguish between practical agreements, customs arrangements and full membership. It should explain any proposed payments, clarify the impact on fishing and identify the rules to which Britain would be expected to align.
Most importantly, it should demonstrate that the benefits are real and proportionate to the obligations being accepted.
Britain needs answers before it accepts another reset
Lord Redwood’s warning captures the central concern among Brexit supporters: that a gradual process of closer integration could erode the freedoms secured by leaving the EU while imposing costs that are difficult for voters to assess.
His prediction that Britain would receive nothing worthwhile in return is a political judgement, not an established conclusion. The outcome would depend on the terms of any agreement and whether the government could demonstrate clear advantages.
But his criticism raises questions that Burnham cannot afford to ignore.
Would a reset require additional financial contributions? What would Britain gain in return? Could fishing arrangements change? Would the UK need to align with new EU rules? How would a closer relationship affect trade deals with countries outside Europe? And how would the government ensure that any agreement remained subject to meaningful democratic scrutiny?
Those are the questions that should shape the debate.
Britain does not have to choose between refusing all cooperation and automatically returning to the pre-Brexit system. There is room for specific agreements that serve clearly identified interests. But neither should the government assume that closer ties are inherently beneficial or that the costs are insignificant.
If Burnham wants to reshape Britain’s relationship with Brussels, he must explain the destination, the price and the obligations involved.
The public deserves a clear account of what would change, what would remain under British control and why the proposed arrangement would improve the country’s position.
Until those details are available, the argument will remain a contest between competing political visions. For Redwood and other Brexit supporters, the warning is straightforward: Britain should not surrender money, control over its waters or legislative freedom without a convincing return.
For Burnham, the challenge is equally clear. If his reset is intended to benefit Britain, he must prove it through the substance of the agreement, not simply the promise of a closer relationship with Europe.