Burnham Tried to Knock Farage Down – But the Reform Leader Is Back Stronger
Andy Burnham’s rise to the top of British politics initially appeared to deliver a serious blow to Nigel Farage and Reform UK. Burnham’s victory in the Makerfield by-election was interpreted as a major setback for Reform, particularly because the contest had been closely watched as a test of whether Farage’s movement could continue its rapid expansion into Labour territory. Yet the political story has proved more complicated. Farage has suffered setbacks, but he remains a formidable political force, and Reform continues to pose a major challenge to Burnham’s Labour government.
The Makerfield result was undoubtedly embarrassing for Reform. Burnham returned to Westminster with a decisive victory, and the result gave him the parliamentary platform he had previously lacked. More importantly, Reform was beaten in a constituency where the party had hoped to demonstrate that it could break into traditional Labour territory.
The significance of the defeat was immediately recognised. A Westminster Insider analysis described Makerfield as potentially the making of Burnham’s leadership ambitions while asking whether the result had also damaged Farage’s hopes of reaching Downing Street.
For Burnham, this was politically valuable. He could argue that his style of Labour politics offered an answer to Reform’s rise. Rather than attempting simply to copy Farage on immigration or national identity, Burnham presented himself as a politician who could address the economic frustrations that had pushed some voters towards Reform.
His appeal was based on a simple political proposition: Labour could defeat Reform by giving voters a reason to return to Labour rather than by becoming a version of Reform itself.
That argument appeared convincing after Makerfield.
But Farage was not finished.
Indeed, the subsequent months demonstrated why Reform should not be dismissed because of one electoral defeat. Farage remained highly visible nationally, while Reform continued to lead or perform strongly in national polling despite a series of controversies surrounding the party.
The situation has become particularly interesting because Farage has now taken a major political gamble of his own.
He resigned as MP for Clacton in July 2026, triggering a by-election in his own constituency. The decision created considerable uncertainty because Farage had previously treated his Clacton seat as a crucial part of his political base. The by-election therefore represents both a test of his personal popularity and a test of Reform’s ability to maintain its momentum.
Farage’s supporters can argue that the move demonstrates confidence rather than weakness. By returning to his own constituency and fighting another election, he is putting his personal reputation directly before voters.
But there are obvious risks.
If Farage were defeated in Clacton, it would be a much more serious setback than losing Makerfield. Burnham was fighting to enter Parliament; Farage is already the leader of Reform UK and has spent decades building his political identity around electoral insurgency.
A defeat in his own seat could therefore raise questions about whether his national popularity translates into local support.
The campaign has already revealed a complicated picture. Some voters in Clacton remain strongly loyal to Farage, regarding him as a charismatic politician willing to challenge the established parties. Others are increasingly sceptical, questioning what he has actually delivered for the constituency.
That division illustrates the central challenge facing Farage.
Reform’s success has largely been driven by dissatisfaction with established politics. But once a populist movement becomes a serious political force, voters begin asking a different question: can it actually govern?
It is easier to oppose than to govern.
It is easier to promise radical change than to explain how that change will be funded.
And it is easier to criticise Labour’s failures than to demonstrate that Reform can solve Britain’s problems.
Burnham faces exactly the same challenge now that he is Prime Minister.
This is why the rivalry between the two men has become so important.
Burnham’s political strategy is based on the belief that Labour can defeat Reform by rebuilding its connection with voters. His emphasis on regional government, public services and economic security is designed to appeal to people who feel that Westminster has ignored them.
Farage’s strategy is almost the mirror image. He argues that Britain needs a fundamental political break with the established parties and that Reform represents the vehicle for that change.
Both politicians claim to understand voters who feel ignored.
Both have criticised Westminster’s political establishment.
Both have built strong personal brands.
And both now face the challenge of proving that their political movements can deliver.
That is why Makerfield mattered so much.
Burnham’s victory appeared to demonstrate that Reform could be stopped. But one defeat does not destroy a political movement.
The Financial Times recently noted that Reform suffered a loss of momentum following Makerfield, but also highlighted a series of controversies involving senior party figures and financial arrangements. Despite those problems, Reform remained a major force in British politics.
The party has faced questions surrounding donations, undeclared benefits and the financial affairs of senior figures. These controversies have created opportunities for opponents to attack Reform’s credibility.
Yet Farage has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to survive political controversy.
This is one of the most important features of his career.
Farage has spent years facing criticism from political opponents and the media. He has survived numerous electoral setbacks and repeated attempts by other parties to undermine his political movement.
That resilience means Burnham cannot assume that one victory has solved the Reform problem.
Indeed, Reform’s ability to remain competitive despite internal controversy may be evidence of how deep the underlying dissatisfaction with mainstream politics has become.
Voters may be supporting Reform not because they approve of every Reform politician or every policy, but because they believe the traditional parties have failed.
That presents Burnham with a much more difficult problem.
He cannot simply attack Farage.
He has to provide an alternative.
This is particularly important because Burnham’s early government has itself faced difficult policy choices.
Since becoming Prime Minister, Burnham has attempted to combine a more energetic political style with a relatively moderate economic approach. Analysis of his early economic policies has described him as something close to a “continuity Starmer” economically, despite his stronger communication style and different political presentation.
That could eventually become a vulnerability.
Burnham rose partly because Labour members and voters wanted something different from Starmer. If his government ultimately looks too similar to the government it replaced, voters could begin asking what has actually changed.
Farage would be ready to exploit that contradiction.
He could argue that Burnham promised a political transformation but ultimately delivered only a modified version of the same economic approach.
This is the danger of moderation.
Moderation can make a government appear responsible and reassuring. But it can also disappoint voters who supported change precisely because they wanted something more dramatic.
Burnham therefore faces a political balancing act.
He must maintain economic credibility while demonstrating that his government is genuinely different.
He must appeal to Labour’s traditional voters without alienating moderates.
He must fight Reform without simply adopting Reform’s policies.
And he must demonstrate that greater public investment can be achieved without destabilising the public finances.
Farage, meanwhile, has his own balancing act.
Reform’s political appeal depends heavily on its image as an outsider movement. But the more successful it becomes, the more voters will expect detailed answers.
A party that wants to govern Britain must explain how it would fund its policies, manage public services and maintain economic stability.
The pressure on Reform has therefore increased as its popularity has grown.
The Clacton by-election is part of that test.
Farage’s decision to resign and fight again could either strengthen his authority or expose weaknesses that previously remained hidden.
If he wins comfortably, he can argue that reports of Reform’s decline were exaggerated.
If he wins narrowly, opponents will argue that his personal support is weakening.
If he loses, the consequences could be severe.
The by-election also comes at a time when Farage faces scrutiny over his financial affairs. The Financial Times has reported that his popularity has fallen amid an investigation concerning an undeclared £5 million gift from cryptocurrency backer Christopher Harborne.
Such allegations do not automatically determine how voters will behave. Political supporters often remain loyal despite controversies.
But they can reinforce an existing perception that a politician belongs to the establishment he claims to oppose.
That is a particularly sensitive issue for Farage.
His entire political brand depends on presenting himself as an outsider.
If voters begin to see him as simply another Westminster politician surrounded by controversies over money and political connections, Reform’s distinctive appeal could weaken.
Burnham will be watching carefully.
Yet he should not become complacent.
The same voters who rejected Reform in Makerfield could support the party elsewhere. British politics has become increasingly volatile, and local election results can differ dramatically from national opinion polls.
The Makerfield result demonstrated that Burnham can defeat Reform.
It did not demonstrate that he can defeat Reform everywhere.
That distinction is crucial.
There is another reason why Farage remains dangerous: Reform has developed a national organisation rather than relying entirely on one politician.
Although Farage remains the party’s dominant personality, Reform has expanded its presence across local government and parliamentary politics.
The party’s gains in previous elections demonstrated that its support is geographically broader than many traditional commentators expected.
This means that even if Farage’s personal popularity declines, the political forces that created Reform may remain.
Immigration, housing shortages, pressure on public services, distrust in politicians and concerns about the cost of living are not going away simply because Burnham defeated Reform in one by-election.
Burnham therefore has to tackle the underlying problems rather than merely defeating the messenger.
His approach to regional government could be particularly important.
One of his central arguments has always been that political power is too concentrated in London. Giving regions more control over transport, housing and economic development could allow Labour to demonstrate a different style of government.
If that works, it could weaken Reform’s argument that Westminster politicians do not understand ordinary communities.
But if devolution becomes mainly another political slogan without visible improvements, Farage will have an easy response.
He can simply argue that nothing has changed.
The political battle between Burnham and Farage is therefore likely to be fought not only through speeches and election campaigns but through results.
Who can reduce waiting times?
Who can improve transport?
Who can make housing more affordable?
Who can strengthen wages?
Who can control immigration?
Who can improve public services?
These are the questions that will ultimately determine whether voters remain loyal.
Burnham’s supporters may argue that Labour is better positioned to answer them because it controls the machinery of government.
Farage’s supporters will argue that the established parties have had decades to solve these problems and have failed.
That is the fundamental political argument between them.
It also explains why Burnham’s victory in Makerfield was both important and limited.
It was important because it showed that Reform could be beaten.
It was limited because Reform’s underlying support remained substantial.
Farage has therefore returned from the setback with a clear objective: demonstrate that Makerfield was an exception rather than the beginning of a wider decline.
The Clacton contest gives him the opportunity to do precisely that.
A strong victory would allow Farage to claim that his movement remains electorally powerful. It would also undermine the narrative that Burnham has already become a “Reform slayer”.
For Burnham, the stakes are equally high.
If Reform continues to perform strongly, his opponents within Labour can argue that his political strategy is failing.
The Prime Minister rose partly because he promised to reconnect Labour with voters who had abandoned the party. If those voters continue to support Reform, his leadership will eventually face uncomfortable questions.
This makes Farage a very different kind of opponent from Keir Starmer’s old political rivals.
Burnham defeated Starmer’s leadership because Labour MPs and members wanted a different direction.
But defeating Farage requires something much harder: convincing voters who have already rejected Labour that they should come back.
That cannot be achieved through internal Labour politics.
It requires results in government.
And this is where the real contest between Burnham and Farage begins.
The political irony is that Burnham may have succeeded in knocking Farage down without actually eliminating the threat. Makerfield damaged Reform’s momentum and gave Burnham enormous political confidence, but Farage has demonstrated throughout his career that he can recover from setbacks.
The Reform leader is now attempting to prove exactly that.
His return to the electoral battlefield in Clacton is therefore more than a personal contest. It is a test of whether Reform’s political revolution has genuinely stalled or whether it remains capable of reshaping British politics.
For Burnham, the answer will determine whether his victory was the beginning of a new Labour era or merely a temporary reversal in Reform’s advance.
For Farage, it is an opportunity to demonstrate that one defeat does not define his movement.
And for Britain, the rivalry represents something much larger than a contest between two politicians.
It is a battle between two competing explanations for the country’s political dissatisfaction.
Burnham says Britain needs stronger public services, greater regional power and a Labour government capable of rebuilding trust.
Farage says Britain needs to break with the political establishment altogether.
The winner will ultimately be determined not by Westminster headlines but by voters.
Burnham may have knocked Farage down at Makerfield.
But Farage is still standing.
And if the latest political developments are any indication, the Reform leader is far from finished.