Latest Makerfield Polls Revealed as Labour, Reform and Restore Britain Fight for Key Seat
The Makerfield by-election became one of the most closely watched political contests of 2026, with Labour, Reform UK and the newly established Restore Britain battling for support in a constituency that had suddenly become far more important than its size might suggest.
At the centre of the contest was Andy Burnham, the high-profile Labour politician whose decision to return to Westminster transformed the election into a national political test.
What made Makerfield particularly significant was the strength of the challenge from Reform UK.
The party had made substantial gains across parts of Britain and was determined to demonstrate that its growing popularity could translate into parliamentary victories. Labour, meanwhile, wanted to show that it could still win convincingly in an area where Reform had previously demonstrated considerable support.
Restore Britain added another complication to the contest, competing for voters on the right and potentially dividing support that might otherwise have gone to Reform.
In the weeks before polling day, several constituency polls attempted to measure the battle.
The first major Survation poll, conducted in May, put Burnham on 43 per cent, narrowly ahead of Reform UK candidate Robert Kenyon on 40 per cent. Restore Britain’s Rebecca Shepherd was on 7 per cent, while the Liberal Democrats and Greens were further behind.
The result was striking because it suggested that Burnham’s personal popularity could make a significant difference.
On a generic Westminster voting question, without naming the individual candidates, Reform was reported to have held a much stronger position in the constituency. Survation’s analysis suggested that Burnham’s personal support was enough to move Labour into a narrow lead.
That became one of the defining features of the campaign.
Makerfield was not simply a contest between party labels.
It was also a contest between individual candidates.
Burnham brought with him a national profile built over many years in politics, including his time as Greater Manchester mayor. Reform was attempting to convince voters that the election should instead be treated as a referendum on Labour and the wider political establishment.
The difference between those two arguments was crucial.
For Labour, the message was that Makerfield voters had the opportunity to elect an experienced politician with a strong local and national profile.
For Reform, the argument was that voters should look beyond personalities and judge the record of the political establishment.
As polling day approached, the contest appeared increasingly competitive.
A subsequent Survation poll conducted from late May into early June showed Labour at 49 per cent, with Reform on 39 per cent and Restore Britain on 8 per cent. Other parties remained on relatively small shares.
The poll suggested that Labour’s advantage had widened.
But the margin was still important to interpret carefully.
Constituency polls involve relatively small samples and can contain substantial uncertainty. A lead of several points does not necessarily guarantee victory, particularly in a by-election where turnout and tactical voting can behave differently from a normal general election.
The campaign therefore remained tense.
Reform’s strategy depended partly on persuading voters who had previously supported other parties to switch.
The Conservatives, for example, had suffered heavily in the constituency, while smaller parties were also attempting to retain their supporters.
Restore Britain presented another potential challenge.
The party’s presence meant that voters who wanted a more right-wing alternative had another option.
That created a complicated question for Reform.
Could it persuade Restore supporters to switch tactically?
Or would the division on the right allow Labour to win more comfortably?
The issue of tactical voting became increasingly important as polling day approached.
In a close election, relatively small movements between parties can dramatically alter the result.
A voter who prefers Reform but believes Labour is likely to win might decide to vote for Reform anyway as a protest.
Another voter might decide that stopping Labour is more important and support the strongest challenger.
The same calculation could apply to voters considering Restore Britain.
This is why by-election polling can sometimes be difficult to interpret.
People are not necessarily answering the same question they would answer during a general election.
The presence of a prominent individual candidate can also change voting behaviour.
Burnham’s campaign benefited from his recognition among voters well beyond Greater Manchester.
His years as mayor had given him a distinctive public identity, and supporters argued that this experience made him better prepared for Westminster.
But that profile also made him a target.
For Reform, defeating Burnham would have represented a major symbolic victory.
It would have demonstrated that even one of Labour’s most recognisable politicians was vulnerable to the new political movement.
The contest therefore carried implications far beyond Makerfield.
If Burnham had lost, questions about Labour’s popularity and the strength of Reform would have intensified.
If he won comfortably, Labour could point to the result as evidence that Reform’s momentum was not unstoppable.
The final pre-election polling showed Labour with a clearer advantage than some of the earlier surveys.
The last major poll listed by election-polling analysts, conducted between June 2 and June 12, put Labour on 49 per cent and Reform on 37 per cent, giving Burnham a 12-point lead. Restore Britain and the Greens were each on 5 per cent, according to the poll.
Another poll conducted during the same period put Labour on 45 per cent and Reform on 40 per cent, demonstrating that there was still some variation between surveys.
That difference illustrates why polling should be treated as a snapshot rather than a prediction.
The numbers showed Labour ahead, but they did not guarantee the final outcome.
Campaign events, turnout, tactical voting and late decisions could all influence the result.
Nevertheless, the overall direction of the polling was significant.
Labour had moved from a narrow three-point lead in the first major poll to considerably larger advantages in several later surveys.
Reform remained a serious challenger, but the evidence suggested that Burnham was consolidating support.
Restore Britain, meanwhile, had established a presence but appeared unable to overtake either of the two leading candidates.
The Conservatives were reduced to a marginal role in the contest, underlining the broader transformation of British politics.
Makerfield therefore became an important illustration of the country’s changing political landscape.
The old assumptions of a straightforward Labour-versus-Conservative contest no longer applied.
Instead, voters were being presented with a much more fragmented choice.
Labour faced pressure from the left and centre from smaller parties, while Reform and Restore competed for voters dissatisfied with the traditional political establishment.
That fragmentation created opportunities as well as risks.
For Labour, a divided opposition could make victory easier.
For Reform, however, the challenge was to turn its broader national popularity into constituency-level support.
That is not always straightforward.
A party may perform strongly in national polling while struggling to win a particular constituency because local candidates, tactical voting and personal reputations can have a substantial impact.
Makerfield provided a clear example.
The Reform campaign could point to the party’s broader momentum.
Burnham could point to his personal record and local recognition.
Restore Britain could appeal to voters seeking an alternative to both Labour and Reform.
The final decision therefore rested with voters.
In the end, the result was considerably stronger for Labour than some of the earlier polling had suggested.
Burnham won the seat with 54.8 per cent of the vote, taking 24,927 votes. Reform finished second with 34.5 per cent, while Restore Britain took 6.8 per cent. Labour’s majority was 9,231 votes.
The result meant that Labour held Makerfield, while Reform remained a significant second-place force.
It also demonstrated one of the limitations of constituency polling.
The final Labour share was higher than the range suggested by the major pre-election surveys, while Reform’s actual result was lower than several polls had indicated.
For Labour, the victory provided an important political boost.
For Reform, the result represented a disappointment but not the collapse of its support.
The party still secured more than one-third of the vote, demonstrating that its challenge in traditional Labour territory remained substantial.
For Restore Britain, the result showed both the potential and the limits of attempting to establish a new political force on the right.
The Makerfield contest ultimately became more than a local by-election.
It was a test of whether a nationally recognised Labour figure could withstand the rise of Reform, whether personal popularity could overcome wider dissatisfaction with a governing party, and whether a fragmented political right could translate national momentum into a parliamentary breakthrough.
The polls provided clues.
They showed a contest that began relatively close before Labour gradually opened a larger advantage.
But the final result demonstrated that elections can still surprise even when the polling points in one direction.
Makerfield’s lesson is therefore a simple one.
Polls can reveal the mood of voters, identify trends and highlight competitive races.
They cannot cast the votes.
Only when the ballot boxes are opened does the political reality become clear.